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The New Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Critical Perspectives from History 
William W. Bratton, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Theories of the firm inform and undergird corporate law, 1 but they 
only intermittently appear as principal points in corporate law dis­
course. They stayed in the background during the half century ending 
in 1 980, while a conception of the firm as a management power struc­
ture prevailed unchallenged in legal theory. 2 The situation changed 
around 1 980, when a new theory of the firm3 appeared, imported from 
economics. This "new economic theory of the firm" asserted a contrac­
tual conception. The firm, said its leading text, is a legal fiction that 
serves as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships among individual 
factors of production.4 According to the theory, corporate relation­
ships and structures could be explained in terms of contracting parties 
and transaction costs. Law and economics writers restated corporate 
law in the new theory's terms5 and successfully reoriented legal dis­
course on corporations.6 The new theory already has sunk into the 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. My  thanks 
to Victor Brudney, Drucilla Cornell, Stephen Diamond, M ichael Piore, Paul Shupack, Kathe­
rine Van Wezel Stone, David Sugarman, Peter Temin, Willam Wang, Elliott Weiss, and 
Charles Yablon for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Alan Baral and 
Joseph Tomkiewicz for research assistance. I am grateful for the support of the Samuel and 
Ronnie Heyman Corporate Governance Program of the Cardozo Law School. 
1. Economic theories of the firm concern all producing units, no matter how organized. 
Legal theories of the firm, in contrast, tend to focus on the corporation. 
2. See notes 18-21 infra and accompanying text. 
3. The theory's proponents refer to it as the "modern" theory of the firm. I use "new" 
theory of the firm for two reasons. First, as this article's historical exposition demonstrates, 
the ideas constituting the theory are not modern. However, the particular configuration is 
new both to microeconomics and to corporate law. Second, at least one opponent of the new 
economic theory claims the mantle of modernity for corporate law reform proposals criticized 
by proponents of the new economic theory. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New !\!fades of Discourse 
in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 CEO. WASH .  L. REv. 582,  582 (1984) .  
4 .  M ichael C .  Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN . 305, 310 (1976) .  For l iteral restatements of this in 
the legal l i terature, see,  for example, Robert Hessen, A lVew Concept of Corporations: A Contrac­
tual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 ,  1330 (1979); Reinier H .  Kraakman, 
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857,  862 (1984 ) ;  Kenneth 
E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 927,  930 (1983) .  
5 .  For  a survey, see text accompanying notes 22-26 infra. 
6 .  See note 22 infra. 
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fabric of academic corporate law. 7 Now we have two paradigms, one 
managerialist, the other contractual. 
The new theory's proponents made strong claims on its behalf. The 
economists who originated it proclaimed a major discovery: Professor 
Michael Jensen, for example, predicted that this infant "science of or­
ganizations" will produce a "revolution . . .  in our knowledge about 
organizations" during "the next decade or two . . . .  "8 In the law 
schools, its enthusiasts moved aggressively for equal academic status 
(including representation among the drafters of the American Law In­
stitute's Corporate Governance Project) .9 Even outside observers ex­
pressed enthusiasm about the new perspective's potential. Professor 
Bruce Ackerman saw "the stage . . . being set for a complex, yet broad­
based analysis of the way in which activist law, by controlling the legal 
forms provided to the parties, can shape the way they use their legal 
freedom to plan their activities." 10 
Employing historical analysis, this article disputes these claims. His­
tory contains essential information about theories of the firm: 11 Law­
yers and economists have formulated principles to describe and 
regulate the relationship between individuals and producing institu­
tions on repeated past occasions.12 This article recounts these exer­
cises in American corporate legal history, fitting the new economic 
theory into the resulting pattern. 
Once seen in historical context, the theory loses the revolutionary 
impact claimed by its proponents. It constitutes a significant innova­
tion in neoclassical microeconomic theory. But, outside that limited 
methodological context, it is merely the latest in a long series of at­
tempts to describe and justify the phenomenon of collective production 
7 .  A recent round of discussion on takeovers demonstrates this ,  assuming contractual­
ism without applying the theory formally. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Take­
over Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two ;l.!!odels, 96 YALE LJ. 295 ( 1 986);  Jonathan R. Macey & 
Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L .J. 1 3  ( 1 985) .  
8 .  Michael C .  Jensen, Organization Theory and Methodology, 58 AccT. REV. 3 1 9 ,  324 ( 1 983) .  
Professor Jensen i s  one o f  the originators and masters o f  the new theory. 
9. Judge Ralph Winter attacks the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Pro­
ject because the new economic theory, a "large body of reputable academic opinion in major 
law schools ," i s  "astonishingly unrepresented" among its drafters. Ralph K.  Winter, Jr. , The 
Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 524, 528-29 ( 1 984) .  
10. BRUCE A .  AcKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAw 6 2  ( 1 984) .  Ackerman's "ac­
tivist" seeks to use the law "to design a better form of accommodation between competing 
activities than the one thrown up by the invisible hand." !d. at 3 1 .  Ackerman's stati s t  per­
spective contrasts sharply with the anti-statism that prevails throughout the economic litera­
ture of the new theory of the firm. See text accompanying note 1 7  infra. 
1 1 .  History rarely tends to be pursued in corporate law contexts. Usually this has no ill 
effect, since lack of historical perspective only trivially impairs discussion of the latest techni­
cal regulatory problems. As the context of discussion becomes wider, however, relentlessly 
ahistorical perspectives become limiting and damaging. 
1 2 . Historical information is particularly useful in the evaluation of the new economic 
theory. Many of the theory's basic conceptual elements-for example, classical economic as­
sumptions, political individualism, and antipositivism-have figured into past legal theories of 
the firm .  
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in individualist terms. Such theories have followed from and re­
sponded to economic practice; they have not dominated and deter­
mined it. 
History also shows that contract always has held a constitutive place 
in corporate legal theory. This helps explain the new theory's success 
in the law. Its microeconomic innovations resonate well because they 
reconfirm and highlight antecedent concepts. However, history also 
suggests that the new theory goes too far in demanding that corporate 
law privilege contract. Historically, contract has had an equal, or more 
often subordinate, position in corporate legal theory-a position 
closely grounded in and responsive to economic practice. Changes in 
economic practice during the past two decades, while substantial, have 
not been so fundamental as to mandate that corporate law become ab­
solutely contractual. 
These recent changes in economic practice have played a role in the 
new theory's appearance. Taking the theory as a phenomenon in his­
tory, this article demonstrates that particular economic and legal prac­
tices of the 1960s and 1970s enabled the new theory's formulation. 
The theory, thus viewed, becomes an academic by-product of practical 
changes in the governance of the management corporation.13 It stems 
from and follows the events, repeating time-honored concepts about 
large-scale production in a form responsive to contemporary ways of 
doing business. Thus bound to history, it seems a vehicle unsuited to 
the control and reconstruction of legal practice. 
This article has five parts. Part I describes basic concepts. It sets 
out the elements of traditional legal theories of the firm, managerial­
ism, and the new economic theory. Part II sets out a history of theory 
of the firm concepts in American corporate legal theory. This history 
relates economic, institutional, and doctrinal changes to changes in the­
ories of the firm. More particularly, the account centers on the appear­
ance, success, and endurance of the management corporation in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and corresponding devel­
opments in corporate doctrine. It shows how these practical events 
caused the reformulation of traditional legal theories of the firm and 
shaped the long-prevalent managerialist conception of the corporation. 
The account emphasizes an ongoing conflict between practical devel­
opments and the theorists' political preferences. Production by corpo­
rate entities-a collective phenomenon-conflicted with these 
theorists' individualistic assumptions about society and economics. 
The theories, succeeding one another in history, embody variant solu­
tions to this conflict. 
Part III sets out a parallel history of the theory of the firm in corpo-
13 .  I employ the phrase "management corporation" rather than "public corporation" to 
describe large mass-producing corporations and o ther large corporate entities, the shares of 
which are widely held. 
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rate legal doctrine. This account isolates the theory of the firm con­
cepts underlying the doctrine. Here, in contrast to the theoretical 
evolution described in part II, the story is nonevolutionary. The con­
cepts instantiated in the doctrine have persisted with notable stability 
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. This contrasting pat­
tern follows from its different context. Theoretical tensions between 
individualistic values and collective production do not concern legal 
practitioners. These lawyers, judges, and legislators employ a capa­
cious firm theory, sidestepping theoretical conflicts and resolving con­
flicts between individual autonomy and production imperatives 
piecemeal, on the level of the particular. 
Part IV is a commentary. It relates the histories to the contempo­
rary contest between managerialism and the new economic theory. It 
suggests that historically dominant concepts still inform the law, limit­
ing the potential influence of the new theory. This part also comments 
on the thesis recently advanced by Professor Morton Horwitz that the 
theory of the firm played a causative role in the success of the manage­
ment corporation at the turn of the century.14 Horwitz's thesis, it is 
argued, is untenable in light of the nonevolutionary path of the doctri­
nal theory of the firm identified in this article. 
Part V analyzes the new economic theory as an event in contempo­
rary history. It relates the theory's appearance and success to practical 
developments concerning the management corporation. It suggests 
that the theory would never have existed had finance capitalism not be­
come a force in corporate governance through the operation of the 
market for corporate control. 
I. LEGAL THEORIES OF THE CoRPORATE FIRM AND THE NEW 
EcoNOMic THEORY 
This part sets out the concepts basic to discourse on corporate legal 
theory, both historical and contemporary. First, it describes the recur­
ring questions that legal theories of the firm traditionally address-con­
cepts central to this article's historical accounts. Then it introduces 
concepts informing discourse on the theory of the firm today. It de­
scribes the managerialist conception of the corporation that prevailed 
when the new economic theory of the firm appeared in legal theory 
around 1980. Then it describes the new economic theory as set forth in 
the economics literature in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
A. Traditional Legal Theories of the Corporate Firm 
Traditional legal theories of the corporation 15 pursue an essentialist 
1 4 .  Morton ] . Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA . 
L. REV. I 73, 1 76 ( 1 985) .  
I 5 .  Traditional legal theories of the corporation were a recognizable category of juris-
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inquiry into the corporation's nature and origins.16 This inquiry, 
whether academic or doctrinal, dwells on sets of recurring questions. 
One set of questions asks about the corporation's being. Here one 
line of responses holds the corporation to be at most a reification-a 
construction of the minds of the persons connected with the firm and 
those who deal with them and their products. A conflicting line holds 
the corporate firm to be a real thing having an existence, like a spiritual 
being, apart from the separate existences of the persons connected with 
it. 
A related set of questions looks into distinctions between the corpo­
rate entity (whether real or reified) and the aggregate of separate indi­
viduals and transactions in and around it. This is the "entity or 
aggregate" discussion. It concerns the placement of emphasis between 
the group and the individual. If the corporate entity has a cognizable 
existence, questions arise about the nature and origins of its separate 
characteristics. Here personification-the attribution of human charac­
teristics-provides a metaphorical mode of isolating components of the 
entity's essence. On the other hand, if the notion of an entity lacks 
meaning, the nature and origins of the corporation are determined by 
the relationship of its aggregate parts. Historically, observers taking 
this latter view characterize corporate life as contractual. 
There also is a political version of this essentialist inquiry into the 
corporation's nature and origins. Here the basic question is whether 
the corporation must derive positive authority from the state. The stat­
ist response is called concession theory; the contrary view is called con­
tractual. Concession theory comes in degrees.17 A strong version 
attributes the corporation's very existence to state sponsorship. A 
weaker version sets up state permission as a regulatory prerequisite to 
doing business. The contractual response locates the source of all 
firms' economic energy in individuals. Stated most strongly, this view 
holds that the individuals' freedom of contract implies a right to do 
business as a corporation without state interference. A variant of this 
discussion suggests that the corporation is not a suitable subject for 
regulation because its activities have a "private" rather than a "public" 
nature. 
B. J\.1 anagerialism 
Speculation about the reality of corporations, their entity and aggre­
gate characteristics, and their origins in concession or contract was 
commonplace in legal theory until around 1930. At that time, dis-
prudence and a focal point of legal theory until around 1 930.  See text accompanying notes 82-
93 infra. 
1 6. For a description of the essentialist approach, see note 146  infra. 
1 7 . See William W. Bratton, The · ':Vexus of Contracts'· Corporation: A Critical Appraisal. 7 4 
CoRNELL L. REv. ( l 989) (forthcoming) . 
•' I 
., 
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course in these terms largely ceased as the management-centered con­
ception of large corporate entities took hold.18 The managerialist 
consensus recently disappeared, due in part to the successful emer­
gence of the new economic theory in the legal literature beginning 
around 1980. 
The managerialist picture put corporate management groups at the 
large corporation's strategic center.19 Management possessed hierar­
chical power. This structural power, stemming from their expertise in 
organizing resources, had three aspects. First, management deter­
mined the processes of production and distribution. Second, manage­
ment dominated enormous bureaucracies and exercised authority over 
the lives of all those lower down on the ladder. Third, management­
dominated firms imposed externalities.2° 
This picture's accuracy was not an issue in corporate law. All par­
ticipants, pro- or anti-managerialist, saw the firm as a "structure." All 
agreed that the structure gave rise to power relationships and that man­
agement dominated the structure. The issue was whether management 
held and exercised the power legitimately. Anti-managerialists charged 
that management exercised its power without accountability. This ar­
gument had three parts. First, legal doctrine vested governing power 
of the corporate entity in the board of directors subject to shareholder 
vote. Second, management in fact controlled the board. And third, the 
financial community supported management. Therefore, management 
groups were unaccountable to higher authority. Management's de­
fenders countered with a two-part defense. First came utility-exper­
tise legitimized management authority. Then followed assurances of 
social responsibility-managers were capable of statesmanship.21 
C. The New Economic Theory of the Firm 
Economists devised the new economic theory during the 1970s. It 
appeared in corporate legal theory, achieving wide currency and ac­
ceptance, after 1980.22 The theory challenged the managerial is t pic-
1 8 .  See text accompanying notes 1 04-1 1 0  infra. 
1 9. For a further discussion, see Bratton, supra note 1 7 .  
20.  For exemplars o f  this picture, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. ,  THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITAL­
IST REVOLUTION 32-39 ( 1 954) ;  RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & jOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE 
GIANT CoRPORATION 62-65 ( 1976) .  
2 1 .  See Gerald E .  Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1 276 ,  
1328-34 ( 1 984) 
Berle worked both sides of the fence. While anti-managerialist, he eventually conceded 
that public opinion effectively controlled management and optimistically preached responsi­
bility to the managerial audience. See A. BERLE, supra note 20, at 35-37 ,  54. 
22. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in C01pora­
tion Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH.  L. REv. 557 ( 1 984); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments , 1 02 HARV. L. REv. 1 820 ( 1 989) ;  Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close 
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 2 7 1  ( 1 986);  Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Limited Liab1lity and the Corporation, 52 U .  CHI .  L. REv. 89 ( 1 985) ;  Frank H .  Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 395 ( 1 983) ;  Frank H. Easterbrook 
•. 
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ture of the corporation and prompted renewed concern about the 
nature of the corporation among legal academics. Once again entities 
and aggregates, and concessions and contracts, appeared in corporate 
law discourse. 
The new economic theory has two variants, one strong, the other 
weak. The strong variant has antecedents in neoclassical economics; 
the weak variant has closer ties to institutional economics. 
The institutional variant appeared first. Its earliest antecedent is an 
essay Ronald Coase published in 1937. Coase explained firms and 
markets as alternative forms of contracting, identifying transaction 
costs as the determinants of the choice between the two. 23 This work, 
while seminal, had no noticeable influence among neoclassical econo­
mists until after 1970.24 Even then, Coase's distinction between mar­
kets and firm hierarchies only influenced the institutionalists, who 
restate the received managerialist picture in contractual terms. 
We can precisely date the advent of the neoclassical variant with the 
publication of a paper by Alchian and Demsetz in 1972.25 The water­
shed year was 1976, when jensen and Meckling's well-known analysis of 
the firm appeared.26 These papers draw on neoclassical conceptions of 
contract to devise a radical rejection of the managerialist approach. 
The following describes the two variants, taking the neoclassical 
rendering first. 27 
& Daniel R. Fischel. Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) ;  Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1 983 AM. B.  FOUND. REs. J. 875;  Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Covemance :\.Iovement, 35 V AND. L. REv. 1259 (1982 ) ;  Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual 
Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807, 808-11 (1987) ; Kraakman, 
supra note 4; Saul Levmore, iv!onitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE 
LJ. 49 ( l 982) ; Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 1 3  HoFSTRA L. REv. 9, 39-4 7 ( 1 984) ;  Scott, supra note 4 .  
Critical commentaries have appeared. See Victor Brudney, Co1porate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 403 (1985) ;  Richard M .  Buxbaum, Corpo­
rate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 515 (1984) ; Robert C. Clark, 
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 55 
O. Pratt & R .  Zeckhauser eds.  1 985) ;  Deborah A. DeMott,  Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduci­
ary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879.  
23 .  See Ronald H. Coase,  The Nature of the Firm , 4 EcoNOMICA 386, 390-94 ( 1 937) (re­
printed in READINGS I N  PRICE THEORY 33 1 ,  336-39 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds . 1952) ) .  
24 . Coase reflected in 1 972 that his 1 937 essay was "much cited but  little used." Ronald 
H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, 3 EcoNOMIC RESEARCH: RETROSPECT 
AND PROSPECT 59, 62-63 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972) ;  see also Ronald H. Coase, The Xature of the Firm: 
.\r!eaning, 4 J.L. EcoN .  & 0RG. 1 9, 23 ( 1 988) . 
Other early work came from Oliver Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, :\.Ianagerial Dis­
cretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 1032 ( 1 963) . 
25.  Armen A .  Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or­
ganization, 62 AM. EcoN.  REV. 777  ( 1 972) .  
26. Jensen & M eckling, supra note 4 .  An important contemporaneous work was OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ( 1 975) . 
Other early works include KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION ( 1974) ; Vernon 
L. Smith , Economic Theory and its Discontents, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 320 ( 1 974) . 
Anti-managerialists dominated legal discourse during these years. For example, see Wil­
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974) .  
27 .  For a further discussion, see Bratton, supra note 1 7 . 
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course in these terms largely ceased as the management-centered con­
ception of large corporate entities took hold.18 The managerialist 
consensus recently disappeared, due in part to the successful emer­
gence of the new economic theory in the legal literature beginning 
around 1980. 
The managerialist picture put corporate management groups at the 
large corporation's strategic center.19 Management possessed hierar­
chical power. This structural power, stemming from their expertise in 
organizing resources, had three aspects. First, management deter­
mined the processes of production and distribution. Second, manage­
ment dominated enormous bureaucracies and exercised authority over 
the lives of all those lower down on the ladder. Third, man:::tgement­
dominated firms imposed externalities.20 
This picture's accuracy was not an issue in corporate law. All par­
ticipants, pro- or anti-managerialist, saw the firm as a "structure." All 
agreed that the structure gave rise to power relationships and that man­
agement dominated the structure. The issue was whether management 
held and exercised the power legitimately. Anti-managerialists charged 
that management exercised its power without accountability. This ar­
gument had three parts. First, legal doctrine vested governing power 
of the corporate entity in the board of directors subject to shareholder 
vote. Second, management in fact controlled the board. And third, the 
financial community supported management. Therefore, management 
groups were unaccountable to higher authority. Management's de­
fenders countered with a two-part defense. First came utility-exper­
tise legitimized management authority. Then followed assurances of 
social responsibility-managers were capable of statesmanship.21 
C. The New Economic Theory of the Firm 
Economists devised the new economic theory during the 1970s. It 
appeared in corporate legal theory, achieving wide currency and ac­
ceptance, after 1980.22 The theory challenged the managerialist pic-
18. See text accompanying notes 1 04-1 1 0  infra. 
19. For a further discussion, see Bratton, supra note 1 7. 
20.  For exemplars of this picture, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. ,  THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITAL­
IST REVOLUTION 32-39 (1954) ; RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & jOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE 
GIANT CoRPORATION 62-65 ( 1976) .  
2 1. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy i n  American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1 27 6, 
1 328-34 ( 1 984) .  
Berle worked both sides o f  the fence. While anti-managerialist, h e  eventually conceded 
that public opinion effectively controlled management and optimistically preached responsi­
bility to the managerial audience. See A. BERLE,  sup1·a note 20, at  35-37 ,  54 . 
22 .  See, e.g . ,  Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corpora­
tion Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Direct01·, 52 GEo. WASH .  L. REv. 557 (1984) ;  Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1 820 ( 1 989) ;  Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close 
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN.  L. REv. 271  ( 1 986) ;  Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R.  
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U .  CHI. L. REv.  89 (1985) ;  Frank H.  Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in  Corporate Law, 26  J.L. & EcoN.  395 ( 1 983) ;  Frank H.  Easterbrook 
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ture of the corporation and prompted renewed concern about the 
nature of the corporation among legal academics. Once again entities 
and aggregates, and concessions and contracts, appeared in corporate 
law discourse. 
The new economic theory has two variants, one strong, the other 
weak. The strong variant has antecedents in neoclassical economics; 
the weak variant has closer ties to institutional economics. 
The institutional variant appeared first. Its earliest antecedent is an 
essay Ronald Coase published in 193 7. Coase explained firms and 
markets as alternative forms of contracting, identifying transaction 
costs as the determinants of the choice between the two.23 This work, 
while seminal, had no noticeable influence among neoclassical econo­
mists until after 1970.24 Even then, Coase's distinction between mar­
kets and firm hierarchies only influenced the institutionalists, who 
restate the received managerialist picture in contractual terms. 
We can precisely date the advent of the neoclassical variant with the 
publication of a paper by Alchian and Demsetz in 1972.25 The water­
shed year was 1976, whenjensen and Meckling's well-known analysis of 
the firm appeared. 26 These papers draw on neoclassical conceptions of 
contract to devise a radical rejection of the managerialist approach. 
The following describes the two variants, taking the neoclassical 
rendering first. 27 
& Daniel R .  Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 9 1  YALE LJ. 698 ( 1 982) ;  Daniel R .  Fischel, 
The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1 983 AM. B. FouND.  REs. J. 875; Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Co1porate Governance !V!ovement, 35 V AND. L. REv. 1 259 ( 1 982) ;  Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual 
Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807 ,  808- 1 1 ( 1 987) ;  Kraakman, 
supra note 4; Saul Levmore, :'v!onitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE 
LJ. 49 ( 1 982) ; Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 1 3  HoFSTRA L. REv. 9, 39-4 7 ( 1 984) ; Scott, supra note 4 .  
Critical commentaries have appeared. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1 403 ( 1 985) ;  Richard M .  Buxbaum, Corpo­
rate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 5 1 5  ( 1 984) ;  Robert C .  Clark, 
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNESS 55 
Q. Pratt & R .  Zeckhauser eds. 1 985) ;  Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduci­
ary Obligation , 1 988 DUKE LJ. 879. 
23 .  See Ronald H .  Coase, The Nature of the Firm , 4 EcoNOMICA 386, 390-94 ( 1 937) (re­
printed in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 33 1 ,  336-39 (G. S tigler & K .  Boulding eds. 1 952) ) .  
2 4 .  Coase reflected i n  1 972 that his 1 937 essay was "much cited but little used ."  Ronald 
H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, 3 EcoNOMIC RESEARCH: RETROSPECT 
AND PROSPECT 59, 62-63 (V. Fuchs ed. 1 972) ;  see also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: 
Meaning, 4 J .L. EcoN.  & 0RG. 1 9 , 2 3  ( 1 988) . 
Other early work came from Oliver Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, ;'v/anagerial Dis­
cretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM.  EcoN. REv . 1 032  ( 1 963) . 
25.  Armen A .  Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or­
ganization, 62 AM. EcoN.  REv. 777 ( 1 972) .  
26. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4 .  An important contemporaneous work was OLIVER 
E .  WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND H IE RARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ( 1 975) .  
Other early works include KENNETH ] . ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION ( 1 974) ;  Vernon 
L. Smith, Economic Theory and its Discontents, 64 AM.  EcoN.  REv. 320 ( 1 974) .  
Anti-managerialists dominated legal discourse during these years. For example, see Wil­
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J .  663 ( 1 97  4 ) .  
27 .  For a further discussion, see Bratton, supra note 1 7 .  
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The neoclassical variant's central point is that the firm is a legal fic­
tion that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among indi­
vidual factors of production.28 Applied to corporations, this assertion 
displaces the management centered conception. The firm, taken as a 
neoclassical contracting nexus, is not necessarily a hierarchy in which 
authority determines terms by fiat. As Alchian and Demsetz said in 
their 1972 article, firms have "no power of fiat, no authority, no disci­
plinary action." They do not differ "in the slightest degree from ordi­
nary market contracting between any two people." The neoclassical 
variant reconceives management as a continuous process of negotiation 
of successive contracts. The dissatisfied party always can terminate its 
dealings with the firm.29 
From this starting point, the neoclassical theorists construct a model 
of the management corporation. They find parties and terms for their 
firm of contracts by drawing on economists' basic assumptions about 
the behavior of marketplace actors and the nature of marketplace con­
tracts. The actors are rational economic actors30-self-interested indi­
viduals with divergent interests.31 The contracts are the equilibrium 
contracts that rational economic actors enter into when dealing in mar­
kets32-instantaneous exchanges between maximizing parties. The 
parties make complete choices, dealing with unknown factors in the ex­
change price. 33 The theorists further assume that effective competition 
exists among the contracting parties. They also apply the principle of 
natural selection. That is, rational economic actors, consciously or not, 
solve problems in the process of pursuing wealth maximization. Given 
the actors' capabilities and intense competition, only optimal con­
tracting strategies survive. 34 
Within this framework, firm contracts take forms determined by the 
now well known imperative of agency cost reduction. The process 
works as follows. Risk-allocating contracts have winners and losers. 
28.  This formulalion draws on lhe original language of Jensen & Meckling, 5upra nole 4 ,  
al 3 1  0;  5ee ai.Jo Eugene F .  Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownenhip and Control, 26 J.L . 
& EcoN.  30 1 ,  302 ( 1 983) ; Jensen, 5upra nole 8, al 326.  In lhe legal lileralure, see, e .g. ,  Fischel, 
The Corporate Governance :vlovement, 5upra nole 22, al 1 2 6 1 -62;  Scoll, 5upra nole 4, al 930. 
29.  See Alchian & Demselz, 5upra nole 25,  al 777; see ai.Jo id. al 794. In anolher essay, 
Demselz admils lhal lhere are some people who derive ulilily from coercive relalionships, bUl 
he ciles oply bullies and rapisls as exemplars of lhe lype. Harold Demselz, Profe55or 
.V/ichelman '5 Unnece55ary and Futile Search for the Philo5opher s Touchstone, in 24 NoMos: ETHICS, 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 41, 44 ( 1 982) .  
30 .  Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problem5 and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J .  PoL .  EcoN.  288,  289 
( 1 980) .  
31. See Jensen, 5upra nole 8 ,  al  331; William H .  Meckling, Value5 and the  Choice of :vlethod in 
the Social Science5, 1 12 ScHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER VoLKWIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK 545, 
548-49 ( 1 976) .  
32 .  See Jensen, 5upra nole 8 ,  al 327.  
33 .  See I an R .  Macneil ,  Economic Analy5i5 of Contractual Relatiom: l /5  Shortfal/.5 and the .Veedfor 
a "Rich Cla55ificatory ApparatUJ, " 75 Nw. U .L. REv. 1 0 1 8, 1022-23,  1039-40 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
34 .  Jensen, 5upra nole 8 ,  al 322 ,  327 .  
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Maximizing losers tend to "shirk"-that is, take actions to avoid having 
to perform their promises fully. Agency costs are the costs of shirking. 
Since rational economic actors know about shirking, they charge 
agency costs against their contracting partners ahead of time. Given 
competition, the party who most reduces agency costs has the edge. 
Again, applying the principle of natural selection, the lowest cost con­
tract forms survive.35 
With this model the theorists have rationalized, inter alia , the posi­
tive law of relations among shareholders, boards of directors, and of­
ficers; the internal decisionmaking structures, policies, and procedures 
of corporate bureaucracies; and the contracts firms make with employ­
ees, suppliers, and creditors. Jensen and Meckling set out the basic 
themes. Managers act as agents to shareholder principals. When se­
curities are sold publicly by management groups to outside shareholder 
principals, the purchasing shareholders assume that the managers will 
maximize their own welfare; the purchasers therefore bid down the 
price of the securities accordingly. Management thereby bears the 
costs of its own misconduct and has an incentive to control its own be­
havior. 36 It achieves self-control, increasing the selling price of its se­
curities by offering monitoring devices. These include common 
features of the corporate landscape such as independent directors and 
accountants, and legal rules against self-dealing.37 Subsequent essays 
from within the school expand the picture, pointing out that pressures 
from the management labor market38 and the market for corporate 
control also impel management to reduce agency costs. The received 
35. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 8, at 33 1 ;  Fama & Jensen, supra note 28,  at 30 I. 
36. In the Jensen and Meckling model, the public sale is a secondary offering by the 
management group. In more complex, real world situations, the incentive is less intense.  
37 .  This s tory, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4,  at 314 ,  has been often repeated in 
the law reviews. See, e.g., Fischel, The Corporate Govemance .V!ovemenl, supra note 22,  at 1262-65 . 
Preceding Jensen and Meckling, Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 25 ,  also explained corpo­
rate structure in terms of agency costs .  But it  painted a somewhat different picture. Jensen 
and Meckling took a governance perspective. They built their model around a hypothetical 
close corporation situation in which an owner management group sells equity to outsiders. 
Alchian and Demsetz emphasized the production process , focusing on shirking problems 
among individuals on production teams. The existence of management groups is explained 
as a function of shirking by input factors. Monitors (managers) must be accorded power to 
observe, but further arrangements are necessary since managers themselves will shirk. 
Residual income shares reduce this incentive. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 25, at 781-
82, 787-88. 
Jensen and Meckling criticized this picture as too narrowly focused. See Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 4, at 3 1 0 .  Interestingly, the Alchian and Demsetz picture has been re­
peated in eclectic law review commentary subsequent to the Jensen and Meckling repudiation 
of it .  See Scott, supra note 4, at 930-31; Ralph K. Winter, Jr. ,  Stale Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 272-73 ( 197 7) .  
38 .  For the suggestion that management labor markets provide the  primary discipline, 
see Fama, supra note 30, at 294-95. This is disputed in Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and 
Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 367,  368 (1983) ,  which 
takes the position that wage discounts cannot be taken into account in wage contracts ex ante. 
For criticism of Fama's point that junior managers can be expected to monitor senior manag­
ers, see Eisenberg, supm note 3, at 584. 
'( 
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division of authority between officers and board is explained in terms of 
low-cost information fiow.39 
This picture's implications become apparent if we contrast it with 
the earlier managerialist picture. The managerialist picture set out a 
structure and placed management at the top in a position of power. 
Pro-managerialists asserted that expertise necessitated this; anti­
managerialists asserted that the power arose due to the absence of mar­
ket constraints. The neoclassical new economic theory brings market 
constraints back into the picture. The discipline of price competition in 
the product market is accompanied by pricing disciplines from the mar­
kets for corporate securities and the markets for managers and other 
labor. The firm springs out of contracts in all of these markets. Since 
the contracts are bilateral, management power and corporate hierar­
chy, as previously conceived, disappear. In a firm of bilateral contracts 
between free market actors, both parties possess equal power to con­
tract someplace else. 
The neoclassical picture also implies a limited role for corporate 
law. Corporate law does not invest and legitimize power in hierarchical 
superiors; instead, it appears as just another term of the contract gov­
erning equity capital input. Given the model's basic assumption that 
the fittest arrangements survive, the contract presumably effects an op­
timal sharing of risk.40 The model, then, affords no basis for interven­
tion by government for the protection of shareholders. 
2. The institutional variant. 
The institutional variant, like the neoclassical variant, announces 
that the firm is contract. However, noteworthy differences distinguish 
this approach. First, the institutionalists grant that the firm exists as a 
single maximizing unit, not simply as an artifact of transactions among 
maximizing individuals.41 While comprised of contracts, this firm en­
tity amounts to a hierarchy. It is a "governance structure," distinguish­
able in a meaningful way from market contracting.42 Following Coase, 
the institutionalists inquire into differences between market and firm 
organization. 
Second, the institutionalists assume an economic actor possessing a 
wider repertoire of human traits than does neoclassical economic man. 
Specifically, the institutional contracting party suffers from "bounded 
rationality" and engages in "opportunistic conduct. "43 The former re-
39.  See Fama & Jensen, supra note 28, at 302-05. 
40. Klein, supra note 38, at 370. 
4 1 .  See Macneil , supra note 33, at I 022-23 .  
42 .  See Oliver E. Williamson, Th e  .\1/odem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Allributes, 1 9  J. 
EcoN. LIT. 1 537 ( 1 98 1 ) . Williamson sees the distinction between the firm and the market as a 
matter of degree. See Oliver E. Williamson, Intellectual Foundations: The .\'eed for a Broader View, 
33j. LEGAL Enuc. 2 1 0 , 2 1 4  ( 1 983) .  
43 .  See Williamson, The ivlodem Corporation: On"glns, Evolution, Allnbutes, supra note 42 ,  at 
1 544-45 (using "opportunism" for "opportunistic conduct"). 
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fers to an actor's limited ability to solve problems and process informa­
tion. Bounded rationality prevents the institutionalist actor from 
achieving the neoclassical actor's concrete risk analysis and from mak­
ing complete choices. Opportunistic conduct goes beyond the neoclas­
sical actor's self-interested maximization to "guile"-behavior a lawyer 
would term "culpable." 
These human failings inform the institutionalist picture of the firm 
contracting process. The parties know that they cannot achieve com­
plete exchanges in all situations. They therefore leave terms open and 
consent to structures and processes to govern the relationship's fu­
ture.44 Parties choose these "governance structures" over market ex­
changes where, for example, one or both parties' performance requires 
a transaction-specific investment susceptible to appropriation by the 
other. The parties design a transactional structure to prevent appropri­
ation. Firm organization, along with most other forms of long-term 
contracting, is one of these transactional structures.45 
Many other matters affect the institutionalists' transaction struc­
tures. Some, such as free rider problems and agency costs, also figure 
prominently in the neoclassical models.46 But the institionalists also 
mention nonrational phenomena, such as human attitudes.47  Authority 
and relational values also enter into the parties' transactional solutions: 
For example, fiat may be the cheapest way to solve problems; coopera­
tion and reciprocity may reduce uncertainties, and hence costs, by caus­
ing expectations to converge.48 
These differences result in a more thickly textured picture of the 
firm than that presented by the neoclassicists. Moreover, it embodies 
one main tenet of managerialism-the occurrence of a meaningful firm 
entity amidst an aggregate of individual transactions. With its hierar­
chies, planning failures, and bad faith conduct, the institutional variant 
approximates the picture of the firm underlying corporate legal 
doctrine. 
Differences between the neoclassical and institutional pictures 
should not be emphasized too much, however. If we view both variants 
of the new economic theory together against the universe of alternative 
possible explanations of the firm, they represent a common point of 
view for many purposes. The institutional theorists, like the neoclas­
sicists, view the firm as a contract and explain its structural features as 
44.  See Macneil, supra note 33,  at 1043 .  
45 .  Benjamin Klein, Robert G.  Crawford & Armen A.  Alchian, l'ertical lntegration, Appro­
priable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 2 1  J.L. & EcoN. 297,  298, 307-24 (1978) ,  
gives nice examples of firm-specific investments and transaction structures. For an analysis of 
corporate organization in terms of firm-specific investment, bounded rationality, and oppor­
tunistic conduct, see Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Govemance, 93 YALE L.J .  1197 (1984) .  
4 6 .  See Williamson, The :v!odem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Atlributes, supra note 42 ,  at 
1 547-48 .  
4 7 .  0 .  WILLIAMSON, supra note 26,  at 256-57 .  
48 .  ! d.  at 30-40. 
,j 
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the cost-saving devices of transacting parties. They share with the ne­
oclassicists a noninterventionist political perspective. Since their firm 
"is contract," and since private actors do a better job at making con­
tracts than do government officials,49 they see little constructive role 
for public policy. In addition, the institutionalists, like the neoclas­
sicists, employ a methodology that delimits the scope of their inquiry 
and analysis. This approach assumes that transaction cost reduction 
best explains private contracting patterns, and they explain firm phe­
nomena only as means to that end. When their inquiry does not lead to 
an explanation within this functional paradigm, both institutionalists 
and neoclassicists either try again or abandon the search; neither looks 
to the world of political, social, and economic behavior outside. 
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF LEGAL THEORIES OF THE 
CoRPORATE FIRM 
This part recounts the evolution of theory of the firm concepts in 
American corporate law history. The account is divided into five 
stages: the early nineteenth century to 1850; the mid-nineteenth cen­
tury to the 1880s; the turn of the century; the twentieth century to 
around 1980; and finally, the recent appearance of the new economic 
theory. For each of the first four stages the account sets out primary 
points from the economic history of corporations and from the history 
of corporate legal doctrine. It then relates these points to the period's 
theories of the firm. At the fifth stage, the account returns us to the 
contemporary end point introduced in part I-the conflict between 
managerialism and the new economic theory. 
The story has a constant theme: The corporate entity rises, posing 
challenges to both economic and legal theory. Both types of theory are 
based on individualism. They employ models of economic life based 
on visions of production by individual producers and transactions be­
tween individuals, all of whom bear responsibility for their own actions. 
These models must be adjusted to account for group production. In 
the case of economic theory, with its construct of entrepreneurial, 
profit-maximizing behavior by rational economic actors, the adjustment 
requires that the individuals' entrepreneurial behavior patterns be re­
constructed or replaced somewhere in the collective producing institu­
tion. An analogous adjustment takes place in the case of legal theory. 
The corporate unit must be integrated with a wider legal fabric that 
assumes individual actors, makes them responsible, and seeks to facili­
tate their development.50 As the corporation's economic significance 
increases, it becomes harder to reconcile its size and power with this 
49. See Oliver Williamson, Organization Fon , Residual Claimants a nd Corporate Control, 26 
J.L.  & EcoN.  35 1 ,  36 1 ( 1 983) .  
50 .  For a recent s tatement of a general theory, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC SoCIETY ( 1986) . 
July 1989] THEOR Y OF THE FIRM 1483 
individual-based system.5 1 
The historical story climaxes when the management corporation ap­
pears at the turn of the century. Production by great collective entities 
becomes a reality rather suddenly. As collective production becomes 
more successful, theoretical adjustments consonant with individualism 
become harder to formulate. Successive efforts to resolve this tension 
mark the twentieth century history of the theory of the firm. The new 
economic theory is simply the latest exercise in the series. 
A. The Early Nineteenth Century to 1 85 0 
Very little tension arose between economic practice and individual­
ist economic and legal theory in the early nineteenth century. 52 The 
economy closely resembled the atomistic type described in Adam 
Smith's classical theory. Economic units tended to be individual rather 
than collective. Individuals produced goods for sale in the market. In­
dividuals bought goods for consumption in the market. To the extent 
production was organized, the market did the organizing by coordinat­
ing prices. 53 
Classical economic thinking integrated production and distribution 
with the wider scheme of politics and society. People assumed that 
market competition would keep the incompetence and greed of owners 
of the means of production under control . Thus, the competitive mar­
ket legitimized private economic power. People also assumed that 
profit-oriented investors closely scrutinized the managers of firms.54 
Thus, the figure of the rational profit maximizer legitimized the posi­
tions of decisionmakers in individual firms. 
This individual perspective undergirded business law. Actors in the 
economic system received legal support from a regime of individual 
5 1 .  Allen Kaufman & L. S. Zacharias, The Problem of the Corporation and the Evolution 
of Social Values ( 1 987) (Management Research Center Working Paper, Univ. of Mass. School 
of Management, Amherst ,  Mass.) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) ,  casts the history of 
theories of the firm in the framework of nineteenth century ideological dualism, an approach 
currently popular among historians .  "Civic republicanism,"  on the one hand, was egalitarian 
and stressed personal development. I t  viewed property as a prerequisite for developing the 
moral character of the citizen and for establishing the market as a meeting place for independ­
ent producers. Large corporations disrupted the civic republicans' economic assumption of 
widespread individual property ownership. "Liberalism,"  on the other hand, viewed propertY 
as an ins trument for individual prosperity and property rights as a means of individual protec­
tion against the outside world. The corporation challenged the liberals' assumption of pri­
vate, individual market competition. !d. at 5-8. 
52 .  This was true at least once the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian adherents of classical. 
political economy eliminated Federalist mercantil ist policies. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Thf 
Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO . LJ. 1 593 ,  1 605- 1 2  ( 1 988) . 
53 .  See PETER TEMIN, THE jACKSONIAN EcoNOMY 1 77 ( 1 969) (the American economy in 
the 1 830s "functioned to a large extent in the fashion described by what we now call classical 
economic theory") ; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, jR . ,  THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU­
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 5-28 ( 1 977 ) .  
54 .  See jAMES WILLARD HuRST, THE LEGITIMACY or THE BusiNESS CoRPORATION IN THE 
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possessory property rights.55 People did not yet associate the corpo­
rate form with general business, and, in fact, few businesses took the 
corporate form. This was corporate law history's "special charter" 
phase. Corporate doctrine, as received from Great Britain, held that 
the corporate form was instituted by the sovereign's grant of a charter. 
The American states tended to confer charters on businesses that re­
ceived state franchises-e.g. , public utilities, transport concerns, banks, 
insurers, and water works-and thus were perceived to require regula­
tion outside of the market system. 56 
The prevailing legal theories described the corporation as a legal 
fiction and an artificial entity.57 Rephrased in modern terms, this 
meant that the corporation was an entity, and that the entity was a state­
created reification. This operative "concession" notion had been re­
ceived from British law. With the special charter as the dominant mode 
of corporate creation, this concession-based corporate theory accu­
rately described American corporate practice. 
Contractualism also was part of the British inheritance. During the 
two centuries prior to the American Revolution, British lawyers had re­
sisted the sovereign's assertions of authority to create new legal actors 
pursuant to concession doctrine. They maintained that only natural 
persons occupied the legal world, and they advanced contractual con­
ceptions of the firm.58 American law, with its "artificial entity" and 
"legal fiction" concepts, carried on this tradition of individualism,59 
even as it conceded the existence of state-created juridical persons. 
The American concepts denied economic reality to the juridical con­
struct. Corporations were "artificial" and "fictive" in part because ob­
servers looked to the conduct of individuals for the economic substance 
of businesses.60 Thus, American legal theory fastened the classical 
conception of the economy as a system of transactions among individu­
als onto a legal foundation of individual property rights. 
This description must end on a complicating note, since, despite all 
55. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. ,  Coherency and the Social Sciences, in PEOPLE, PowER AND Pouncs 6,  
10 (L.J. Gould & E.W. Steele eds .  1 96 1 ) ;  cf A. BERLE, supra note 20,  at  34-35 (property rights 
remained unchanged while corporations aggregated the power to plan the course of the 
economy) . 
56. J. HuRST, supra note 54, at 7-8. 
57 .  See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35  YALE L.J. 655 ,  
667-78 ( 1 926) ;  Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REv .  594 ,  60 1 ( 1 924) .  
58. Arthur J .  Jacobson, The Pnvate L'se of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the 
Common Law, 29 BuFFALO L. REv. 599, 662-63 ( 1 980) .  
59. Horwitz, supra note 14,  at 1 8 1 .  
60. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the most famous corporate law case of the early 
period demonstrates this. The Dartmouth College case held that a "corporation is an artificial 
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law . "  Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v .  Woodward, 1 7  U .S .  (4 Wheat.) 5 1 8 ,  636 ( 1 8 1 9) ;  see text accompanying 
notes 1 60- 1 6 1  infra. 
The charters themselves were viewed as contracts and not as equivalent to statutes. See 
ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C .  MEANS, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
1 2 1  (rev. ed. 1 968) . 
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the individualist concord, the legal foundations for later corporate col­
lectivities were laid during this early period. Early American corporate 
practice was more extensive and more highly developed than any in 
contemporary Europe.6 1  According to Hurst, the legal form of the cor­
poration had the functional capability for centralized production as 
early as the 1850s-by then the doctrinal provisions of free transfera­
bility and unlimited life were in place. More important, the doctrine 
instantiated group values. Corporate law favored strong central direc­
tion of assets, barred stockholders from a direct managerial voice, and 
accorded management considerable assurances of tenure.62 
B. The Middle Period-the 1 850s to the 1 880s 
This was a transitional period in corporate history. Increased pro­
duction by incorporated businesses ended the harmony between eco­
nomic practice and individualist modes of thinking. Individualists 
began to object to corporate institutions, and devices designed to meet 
their objections showed up in corporate doctrine. 
A factory economy developed during this period, as entrepreneurs 
launched the first manufacturing corporations.63 The corporation be­
came a common legal form for doing business, including manufactur­
ing and selling.64 The first great management hierarchies also 
appeared during this period, but these governed only the railroads. 
Manufacturing, while now corporate, continued under simple govern­
ance structures; substantial identity still existed between owners and 
managers. 65 
The states enacted "general corporation -laws" to assure equal ac­
cess to the corporate form. These laws emerged in a relatively set pat­
tern, including provisions respecting corporate purposes, directors' 
powers, capital structure, dividends, amendments, and mergers.66 
The proliferation of general corporation laws necessitated adjust­
ments in the underlying theory of the firm. The "legal fiction" and 
6 1 .  Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, in PuB­
LIC PoLICY AND THE MoDERN CoRPORATION 3, 7 ,  23-24 (D. Grunewald & H.  Bass eds. 1 966) . 
62.  J .  HuRST, supra note 54, at 25 (stating that this "armed" management for "vigorous 
maneuver") .  
63.  See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections o n  Investment .\1anage­
menl Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REv. 56 1 ,  562 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
64 . The corporate form ceased to be associated with "public interest" enterprises. The 
new corporations were industrial concerns, and the pace of industrial incorporation increased 
significantly after 1 870. PETER GEORGE, THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 79 ( 1 982 ) ;  
see also A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  a t  235-39, 240-4 7 (discussing the appearance of  mass 
distribution systems and factory system, and the disappearance of the putting-out sys tem) . 
65. A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 237-38. 
66. J .  HuRST, supra note 54, at 37 ,  55-57, 69; see Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the 
Business C01poration in Amen can Law, 54 U. CHI .  L. REv. 1 44 1 ,  1 455 ( 1 987) (student author) 
("The transformation of the private law of corporations from 1 8 1 9 to the 1 920s is best de­
scribed as a move from a circumstance in which a corporation could do only those things 
specifically allowed by its charter to one in which a corporation could do anything not specifi­
cally prohibited by it .") . 
" \, 
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"artificial entity" notions were questioned because new statutes im­
paired their base in concession theory. With equal access to the form 
assured, corporations no longer seemed a product of sovereign grace. 
Although many still saw a reified corporate entity, widespread use of 
the corporate form directed attention away from juridical constructs 
and toward the social reality of the business and the creative energy of 
the individuals conducting it. 
Widespread use of the corporate form also aroused individualist 
criticism. Individual economic power seemed to decline as corporate 
manufacturing expanded. With factory owners managing production, 
workers and consumers lost some of the control they had exercised 
through employment and purchase transactions in the earlier, atomistic 
economy. Other commentators charged that corporations subverted 
market control of private economic power. As separate economic enti­
ties, corporations diluted individual moral and legal responsibility 
among groups of business people. Furthermore, the corporate mode 
of conducting business through agents was criticized as inefficient, 
since the agents would never display the zeal of individual 
entrepreneurs.67 
The management structures of the mid-century railroads presented 
the most striking departures from the classical economic model. Like 
later management corporations, these corporations had large manage­
rial hierarchies and were financed by outside equity holders. But unlike 
later management corporations, which had large numbers of outside 
stockholders holding small blocks of stock,68 these railroads had small 
numbers of outside stockholders holding large blocks of stock. The 
railroads' outside equity investors sought an active role in their internal 
affairs. Outside investment bankers sat on the boards and exercised 
vetoes against management. Conflicts of interest arose because the fi­
nancial interests wanted short-term profits while the managers took a 
long-term perspective.69 
The classical economic model did not offer a solution for this con­
flict. It assumed that profit-maximizing, individual entrepreneurs both 
owned the means of production and directed production. With the 
railroads, this basic assumption no longer obtained: Groups of manag­
ers and investors, rather than individual actors, became the players. 
Furthermore, their interests came into conflict as ownership and direc­
tion of the means of production began to separate. 
To address individualist concerns, corporate doctrine developed re­
straints against corporate and managerial power. To keep managers 
under control, the doctrine confined corporate activities within the pa­
rameters of a stated purpose. To keep corporations small, the doctrine 
67 .  J. HuRST, supra note 54 , at 43 ,  48 .  
68.  This pattern emerged after 1 890. 
69. See A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at  87,  1 20 ,  1 48 ;  J .  HuRST, supra note 54 ,  at 82. 
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limited their capital.7° Nevertheless, according to Hurst, descriptions 
of the middle period should not overemphasize this anti-corporate 
thinking and restrictive doctrine. Like the preceding and subsequent 
periods of corporate legal history, this one was kind to management. 
General corporation laws effectively defused egalitarian objections to 
the corporation. And corporate law legitimized broad authority to of­
ficers while it kept stockholders out of direct participation in the deci­
sionmaking process. 71 
C. From the 1 880s through the Tum of the Century-The Appearance of the 
Management Corporation 
Management corporations appeared around 1890.72 Before then, 
small firms, whether individually owned or incorporated, had per­
formed single tasks of production or marketing. Now they were joined, 
and in many cases replaced, by large corporations performing multiple 
tasks of production and marketing.73 The new corporations produced 
an array of goods cheaply and in quantity. People perceived them as a 
success.74 
Hierarchies of salaried executives dominated these new corpora­
tions. Successful mass production required long-term policy commit­
ments and substantial investment; professional, salaried managers were 
designated to make these formulations and to direct production. Ac­
tors on the capital markets withdrew from active participation in corpo­
rate management because they saw themselves as lacking in necessary 
expertise. The split in the classical entrepreneurial function, presaged 
70.  See J .  HuRST, supra note 54, at 45 ,  55-57 ;  RoBERT S .  STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 224-27 ,  33 1 -36 (2d ed. 1 949) (summarizing ultm vires doctrine) ; 
Horwitz,  supra note 14 ,  at 1 86-88 .  
7 1 .  J .  HuRST, supra note 54 , at 37 ,  45 ,  55-57 .  Corporate doctrine did facilitate some self­
protection by s tockholders through proportional voting rules and proportional rights to sub­
scribe to new issues of stock. On the other hand, mismanagement was not actionable without 
a showing of gross negligence. !d. at 49. Although a corporate law of investor protection 
developed during this period, its beneficiaries were corporate creditors. 
72. Means uses the term "collective capitalism." See GARDINER C. MEANS, THE CoRPO­
RATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 50-5 1  ( 1 962) .  I use "management corporation" to avoid the 
particular political implications of Means's phrase. 
73. A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 14,  285-86. 
7 4 .  MICHAEL J .  PIORE & CHARLES F .  SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 72 ( 1 984) .  
Between 1 899 and 1 929, the population rose 62 % .  while industrial production rose 
295% and power production rose 33 1 % .  In 1 929 ,  per capita production >vas 60% higher 
than in 1 900. RoBERT SoBEL, THE AGE OF GrANT CoRPORATIONS 52-53 (2d ed. 1 984) .  
The first great integrated enterprises appeared i n  the 1 880s and 1 890s. Firms consoli­
dated manufacturing into larger plants and expanded into operations other than production, 
including marketing, distribution, and raw materials procurement .  See P. GEORGE, supra note 
64 , at 82 .  The result of their success was the decline of the older form of small, self-sufficient 
economic unit during the first decades of the twentieth century. R.  SoBEL, supra , at 52-75.  
The desire for monopoly profits was a principal motivation for integration and combina­
tion during the 1 890s, but other factors figured in. The formation of United States S teel, for 
example, also served the need for sources of raw materials-due to the increased size of 
plants-and the promoters ' desire to reap profits in the financial markets. See PETER TEMIN ,  
iRON AND STEEL IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA ! 90-93 ( 1 964) .  
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by the experience of the mid-century railroad companies, widened: 
Ownership of capital and control of the firm became completely 
separate.75 
Management corporations rapidly came to dominate the econ­
omy.76 Their dominance occasioned a substantial relocation and refor­
mulation of economic power. Corporate control of production 
partially displaced market control, causing power to flow from individu­
als to groups. 
Recall that in the atomistic economy of the first part of the nine­
teenth century, the limited "control" or "coordination" that existed re­
sulted from market forces. In such an economy, actors do not exercise 
power against one another unilaterally. Each individual decides for 
himself or herself what to produce or consume. Power relations are 
bilateral-one can affect another's conduct only indirectly, by refusing 
to contract. 77 Since no one can direct production and consumption de­
cisions, the economic system remains unplanned. 
With management corporations dominant, entities, rather than 
transactions between individuals, guided the flow of goods through the 
processes of production and distribution. Some of this management 
power was effectively unilateral-hierarchical superiors directed subor­
dinates in the production and marketing processes. As to other eco­
nomic actors-investors, suppliers, and consumers-management 
groups exercised varying degrees of dominance in the context of bilat­
erally structured relations. 
Different explanations have been advanced for the management 
corporation's displacement of the market-controlled economy. Assume 
that increases in productivity depend on increasingly specialized use of 
resources and that, in the nineteenth century, the division of labor and 
the development of special purpose machinery made greater productiv­
ity possible.78 Why did the management corporation become the insti­
tutional means to the end of greater productivity? Chandler offers an 
explanation from the perspective of cost economics. In his view, ad­
ministrative coordination permitted greater productivity by lowering 
costs; corporations thus won out in the competitive marketplace. The 
internalization of units of production lowered transaction and informa­
tion costs, and permitted more intensive use of resources. Internaliza­
tion required management.79 Piore and Sabel offer a contrasting 
explanation centered on production. In their view, coordination of re-
75 .  This is the famous point of A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 60. 
76.  For the view that the management corporation need not dominate production in the 
future, see M.  PIORE & C .  SABEL, supra note 74.  
77 .  Macneil originated the term "bilateral power. " I t  is the possibility of an exchange 
whereby two persons release one another from some of the restraints imposed by their re· 
spective unilateral powers. He defines unilateral power as any capacity a person has to subject 
another to some particular effect without the other's consent. Macneil, supra note 33, at I 036. 
78.  See M. PIORE & C .  SABEL, supra note 74,  at 22-23.  
79.  A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 6-8. 
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sources by the price system became impossible as industrial resources 
became highly specialized in the late nineteenth century. The new pro­
duction technologies had high fixed costs, the recovery of which neces­
sitated high levels of capacity utilization. To justify high utilization, 
markets had to be created. The price system could not, by itself, coor­
dinate mass production and mass marketing, so the management cor­
poration was devised to perform the task. 80 
During its " liberal incorporation" phase, lasting from around 1 890 
to 1 930,  corporate law facilitated the management corporation's suc­
cessful appearance. New Jersey, and then Delaware, enacted new gen­
eral incorporation acts in an effort to attract the charters of the large 
corporations. These new acts facilitated managerial action by offering 
standardized corporate structures without ancillary regulation of busi­
ness decisions. Although nineteenth century forms of shareholder par­
ticipation stayed in the statutes, shareholders did not invoke them to 
challenge management arrangements. Judge-made corporate law 
changed too. Mid-nineteenth century fiduciary strictures on managers 
disappeared rather suddenly.81 The fiduciary principle survived in 
name, but, in practice, the system tolerated individual selfishness. 
The legal theory of the firm became a topic of debate just at the time 
management corporations appeared. Both sides of the debate rejected 
the earlier doctrinal notions of the corporation as " legal fiction" and 
"artificial entity." But they diverged in their responses to the manage­
ment corporation. One side was individualist and hostile, hewing 
closely to classical economic notions. The other side abandoned indi­
vidualism for "corporate realism," a metaphysical theory that proved 
congenial to management interests. 
The hostile, individualist side advanced a contractual theory of the 
corporation. This theory incorporated the classical ideals of a disaggre­
gated producer universe and control through market pricing. It carried 
on the individualism of the earlier " legal fiction" and "artificial entity" 
conceptions, even as it rejected concession theory, replacing the sover­
eign with freely contracting individuals. This theory took an aggregate, 
rather than an entity, approach82-separate relationships comprised 
the corporation's ontological center rather than the force of the collec­
tive effort. Awkwardly, this contract theory was hostile to state regula­
tion and to the management corporation simultaneously. Choosing a 
lesser evil, its adherents supported state-imposed restrictions on corpo­
rate activities through corporate law restrictions on size and purpose.83 
80. M .  PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 74,  at 49-5 1 .  
8 1 .  See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CoRPORATE LAw 1 60-66 ( 1 986) ; Howard Marsh,  Jr. ,  .-lre 
Directors Trustees ? Conflict of Interest and Corporate .\I orality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 ,  39-40 ( 1 966) (s trict 
rules dropped by 1 9 1 0) .  
8 2 .  See I CHARLES FISK BEACH,  THE LAW O F  PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS 1 -4 ( 1 89 1 ) ;  I VICTOR 
MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS J -2 (2d ed. ! 886) ; HENRY 0. TAYLOR,  A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS iv ( 1 884) .  
83 .  See Horwitz, supra note 1 4 ,  at 1 83 ,  204-05. A suit based on the contractual concep-
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At the same time, however, lawyers representing management interests 
drew on contractualism to oppose regulation. For example, in 1 886, 
contractualism served as the vehicle for protecting corporations from 
government regulation under the equal protection clause.84 
The competing theory, corporate realism, drew on European ideas 
about the spiritual reality of group life, principally those of Otto 
Gierke.85 In the United States, its most prominent advocate was Ernst 
Freund, who advanced the theory in a book published in 1 884.86 The 
theory achieved an anti-regulatory accent without individualism. The 
corporate entity was real, and group dynamics were more significant 
than individual contributions. With a real corporate entity, no mean­
ingful split in the entrepreneurial function could occur; the manage­
ment corporation reconstituted the classical profit maximizer in 
collective form. Thus, the theory resolved the tension between individ­
ualism and group production by privileging the group. But when atten­
tion turned to state regulation, individuals returned to the fore: Since 
individuals and not the state supplied the creative force that brought 
the group into existence, respect for individuals counseled against reg­
ulation. Corporate realism thus offered a theory of group production 
without state control. It suited the new management interest.87 
The debate between contractualism and corporate realism lasted for 
only a brief period. Contractualism disappeared as a force in corporate 
legal theory after the turn of the century. People abandoned its under­
lying classical economic conceptions in response to the new corpora­
tions' success as producing entities,88 and the failure of the classical 
model adequately to describe complex, capital-intensive corporate enti­
ties and the oligopolistic economy in which they operated. After 1 890,  
classical notions no longer influenced the formation of corporate law; 
the emphasis in that discourse shifted to legitimization of the produc­
ing group.89 In contrast, corporate realism survived in law reviews into 
tion was brought against the Standard Oil Trust in State v. Standard Oil Co . ,  49 Ohio St .  1 37 ,  
30 N .E .  279 ( 1 892) .  
84 . Santa Clara County v .  Southern Pac. R.R. ,  1 1 8 U .S .  394 ( 1 886) . The court looked 
through the entity to the individual interests at stake and found something protectible. This 
is Professor Horwitz's thesis. He makes the case persuasively. See Horwitz, supra note 1 4 ,  at 
1 73 ,  1 78 ;  see also Mark, supra note 66, at 1 463.  
85.  OTTO GIERKE,  DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT ( 1 887 ) .  Maitland advanced 
Gierke's ideas in the English-speaking world. See OTTo GIERKE, PoLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
MIDDLE AGE i-xlv (F.W. Maitland trans. 1 900) (introduction by Maitland) . For a summary, see 
FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY 1 3  7-65 ( 1 930) ;  see also Mark, supra note 66, at 
1 468-69. 
86. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE oF CoRPORATIONS ( 1 884) .  
87 .  Horwitz, supra note 1 4 ,  a t  1 76 ,  224; Mark, supra note 66, a t  1 470.  
88. Where, for a century, market competition and property law had legitimized power in 
individual hands, now management performance legitimized power in corporate organiza­
tions. J HuRST, supra note 54, at 59, 62, 70, 82 .  
89. See Mark, supra note 66,  at 1 464-65. They survived as a restraining influence only in 
antitrust law. 
J' , . 
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the 1920s90-it offered a theory of groups. 
In the mid 1920s, corporate realism also fell, the victim of a series of 
persuasive critiques, most prominently an essay by John Dewey. These 
critiques denied the existence of a real entity, putting forth a conclusive 
case for the reified corporation.91 After corporate realism disappeared, 
discussion of the nature of the firm in traditional legal terms nearly 
disappeared as well.92 Dewey asserted that the whole jurisprudence 
was pointless. The concepts, he said, were indeterminate. The same 
theories of the firm employed in advancing the case of management 
also advanced the case for labor, and they could be turned against the 
interests of either group.93 
In a recent article, Professor Morton Horwitz reviews the turn-of­
the-century debates on the theory of the firm and deemphasizes 
Dewey's indeterminacy point.94 Horwitz acknowledges that Dewey cor­
rectly recounted the deployment of the same theory of the firm concept 
in support of different interests. But he contends nonetheless that cor­
porate realism should be accorded some determinative significance in 
connection with the rise of the management corporation. Although 
theory of the firm concepts were manipulable, he says, corporate real­
ism better legitimized the practices of the management corporation 
than any other theory then current.95 And he goes further: Corporate 
realism was a "major factor" in legitimizing the management corpora­
tion.96 This article returns to Horwitz's proposition in part IV.97 
D. The Twentieth Century to 1 980 
Management corporations continued their rise during the first half 
90. See George F. Deiser, The juristic Person (pts. 1 -3 ) ,  57  U. PA. L. REv. 1 3 1 ,  2 1 6, 300 
( 1 908-09) (realist) ; Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REv. 404 ( 1 9 1 6) 
(realist) ;  Arthur W. Machen, Jr . ,  Cmporate Personality (pts. 1 -2 ) ,  24 HARV . L. REv. 253 ,  347 
( 1 9 1 1 )  (realist) ; George F. Canfield,  The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 1 7  CoLUM. 
L. REv.  1 28 ( I  9 1 7) (strong entity approach) ; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Individual Liability 
of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws, I 0 CoLUM. L. REv. 283 ( 1 9 1  0) (anti-realist) ; Wesley New­
comb Hohfeld, Xature of Stockholders ' lndzvidual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM.  L. REv. 
285 ( I  909) (anti-realist) . 
9 1 .  Dewey, supra note 57;  see also MoRRIS RAPHAEL CoHEN, REASON AND NATURE 386-92 
(Free Press ed. I 964 ) ;  Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 CoLUM .  L .  REv. 
643 ( 1 932 ) ;  Vinogradoff, supra note 57 .  
92 .  But see Sigmund Timberg, Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and lntemational lmplications, 
46 COLUM.  L. REV. 533 ( 1 946) .  
9 3 .  Dewey, supra note 5 7 ,  a t  669-70 ("Each theory has been used t o  serve the same ends, 
and each has been used to serve opposing ends . . . .  Unfortunately, the human mind tends 
toward fusion rather than discrimination, and the result is confusion ." ) .  
94 . Horwitz, supra note 1 4 . 
95 .  !d. at 224. 
96. !d. at  1 76 .  "In the jargon of the current Critical Legal Studies debate,"  Horwitz 
denies the infinite "flippability" of legal concepts; he ascribes them "tilt" in determining out-. 
comes. !d. 
For a similar, but more cautiously stated view of the influence of corporate realism, see 
Mark, supra note 66, at 1 4  78. 
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of the twentieth century. The image of the corporation as an entity 
rose with them. 
During this period, internal changes in corporate structure en­
hanced management discretion. Early management corporations had 
been single hierarchical units following a "line and organization" struc­
ture; that is, operations managers and top executives worked in the 
same unit.98 After the First World War, a new structure composed of 
multiple divisions appeared in a few leading corporations. The mul­
tidivisional corporation contained more than one operating unit and 
had a top management group responsible for all the units. Top man­
agement became separate from operations management. This permit­
ted long-term policy to be formulated more effectively as 
decisionmakers were freed from localized biases stemming from ties to 
operating units.99 This form of organization became widespread after 
the Second World War, reaching maturity with the conglomerate cor­
porations of the late 1960s.100 
Investment patterns also enhanced management discretion during 
this period. Shareholdings became widely dispersed as small investors 
joined the full-time capitalists as equity investors in management cor­
porations.101 By the 1920s and 1930s, management and these wide­
spread equity investors reached an unspoken, working understanding 
about power and money. Managers of large firms "agreed" to maintain 
stable dividends in return for the freedom to pursue a "growth" strat­
egy. A growth strategy would permit management to raise equity capi­
tal internally, thereby avoiding new issues of equity securities and 
accompanying market judgments about management performance. 
The capital markets, valuing corporate "growth," went along. 102 The 
conventional wisdom, moreover, held that investors had to go along 
whether they liked it or not: There was a collective action problem. 
Under the "Wall Street Rule," individual stockholders never found it 
98. The central office of United States Steel, a complex of many firms that merged over a 
short period in the late 1 890s, did little more than collect accounting information for the 
company's first decade. Central office expansion occurred after 1 9 1 0. P. TEMIN ,  supra note 
74, at 1 92 .  
99 .  A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 462-63, 482.  The new general executive had a bene­
ficial psychological commitment to the enterprise as a whole. !d. at 463. 
1 00 .  Williamson explains these developments with a cost efficiency model :  Multidivi­
sional structure facilitated s trategic planning with a larger information set and better control 
and monitoring of operating units. The result was the direction of cash flows to higher yield­
ing uses. The corporation thus internalized functions formerly performed by the capital mar­
ket. Williamson, The .'vlodem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, supra note 42 ,  at 1 556. 
Once again we can turn to Piore and Sabel for a contrasting view focused on production 
operations rather than management costs. They see the direction of management energies to 
the building of portfolios of operating companies after World War II as a symptom of larger 
macroeconomic problems. Mass-producing corporations saturated their own markets without 
developing new products and new markets. Their risks increased as a result; diversification 
through conglomeration reduced the risk. M. PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 74, at 1 94-97. 
1 0 1 .  Widespread public purchases of shares provided the heavy capitalization required 
by the new firms that appeared at the turn of the century. P. TEMIN ,  supra note 74, at 1 93 .  
1 02 .  A .  BERLE, supra note 2 0 ,  at 3 5 ,  54 . 
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cost effective to challenge the tenure of an ineffective management 
group; selling the shares was the best course of action. 1 03 This unspo­
ken understanding governed management/investor relations until the 
late 1970s. 
Corporate law also continued to support management. The model 
of state corporate law originated by New Jersey and Delaware at the 
turn of the century became the national norm. In the 1930s, the federal 
government supplemented state law with the federal securities laws. 
These required public disclosure of material information for the benefit 
of investors and the securities markets. In contrast to state corporate 
law, the securities laws operated as a moderate constraint on manage­
ment discretion. 
Legal theories respecting the management corporation changed 
substantially around 1930. As already noted, Dewey's 1926 essay 
marked the end of the corporate realist discourse and of corporate the­
ory articulated in traditional terms.1 04 An early and prominent exercise 
in law and economics, Berle and Means's The Modern Corporation and Pri­
vate Property , 1 05 marked the beginning of the new era. Berle and Means 
set out a paradigm based on managerialist concepts drawn from eco­
nomics. In its day, corporate realism had surmounted the split in the 
entrepreneurial function by describing a transcendent corporate being 
akin to a profit-maximizing individual. With the abandonment of this 
notion, managerialism faced the problem of the corporation's inability 
to replicate exactly the individual economic actor's profit-maximizing 
behavior pattern. Managerialism highlighted tensions between the in­
dividual and the corporate collective, departing from the previous dis­
course in that individual interests came to be represented in socialized 
form by government and other "group" representatives. Berle and 
Means recognized that shares of stock no longer carried the traditional 
incidents of property ownership. They offered a substitute concept of 
shareholder/corporate relations built around intermediate securities 
markets. This was a contractual concept: Shareholders supplied capi­
tal and took risks, but then looked to the securities markets for fulfill­
ment of their essential expectations of liquidity and appraisal . 106 
Failures in the operations of the marketplace required legislative inter­
vention.107 But, even assuming successful technical correction of these 
failures, the shareholder interest could not be said contractually to con­
trol management. l OS 
Given this picture, which locates corporate power in the hands of 
1 03. See j .A.  LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 60-6 1 ,  66-67 ( 1 958) . 
1 04 .  See text accompanying notes 9 1 -93 supra . 
1 05 .  A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 60. 
1 06. See id. at 245-50. For a discussion of the implications of this contractual s ide of 
Berle and Means, see Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 5 1 ,  at 20. 
I 07 .  A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 60, at 255-90. 
I 08. Berle and M eans thus combined a contractual conception of the corporation with a 
Weberian bureaucratic conception: Corporations in part were management controlled bu-
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management, management legitimacy became an issue. Participants in 
the discussion chose to address the issue as one of policy-" social" pol­
icy-rather than one of legal theory or doctrine.109 This approach 
seemed to obviate the need for further philosophical discussion of the 
nature of the corporation. 
Economists and legal academics shared the managerialist concep­
tion 1 10 of corporate structure and productive capability. 
1 .  Managerialist economics. 
Berle and Means's book popularized the basic points of institutional 
economics. Although these ideas already had been circulating in differ­
ent forms for several decades, 111 an even more extensive literature 
came after Berle and Means. Institutional economics analyzed the firm 
from outside of the assumptions and methodology of classical and neo­
classical economics. It concluded that the classical model of efficient 
production, in which production occurs at prices tending toward pro­
ducers' marginal costs, did not apply to corporate productive 
processes. Furthermore, market forces controlled neither the struc­
ture, the organization, nor the performance of management corpora­
tions. Within the management corporation, profit no longer was a 
motivating force. 112 With the separation of ownership and control, the 
entrepreneurial drive assumed in classical economics had become split 
between management and capital. Management, the group controlling 
the means of production, was not motivated primarily by profit-seeking, 
but by drives for power, prestige, and job security.1 1 3 
The question was, absent behavior in the classical profit-maximizing 
mode, what behavior patterns and objectives characterized the manage­
ment corporation? Institutionalists made many suggestions. The most 
famous replaced profit with "growth" as the objective, 1 14  and maximiz-
reaucratic entities vested with power by positive law, and in part were the contractual arrange­
ments of economic actors .  See M .  DAN-COHEN,  supra note 50, at 1 7-20. 
1 09 .  Means, for example, promoted a new theory of the firm, a thickly textured analysis 
of the "corporate collective," bringing to bear actual economic, political, psychological, and 
anthropological observations. G. MEANS, supra note 72, at  63 . 
1 1 0. I use the term "managerial ist conception" broadly to encompass entity conceptions 
of the management corporation in which management occupies a position of s tructural 
power. A narrower usage denotes a subcategory of theory in which managers function as 
neutral technocrats , balancing the conflicting interes ts of groups connected to the firm. See 
MASAHIKO AOKI , THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 34-37 ( 1 984) . 
I l l . Thorstein Veblen was the most prominent predecessor. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
ABSENTEE OwNERSHIP ( 1 923) ; THORSTEIN  VEBLEN , THE THEORY OF BusiNESS ENTERPRISE 
( 1 904) .  For a review of the thinking about management prior to Berle and Means, see Eo­
WARD S.  HERMAN, CoRPORATE CoNTROL, CoRPORATE PowER 5-9 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
1 1 2 .  A .  BERLE & G .  MEANS, supra note 60, a t  299-308; see also G .  M EANS,  supra note 72 ,  at 
1 6. 
1 1 3 .  G. MEANS, supra note 72 ,  at 1 7 1 .  
1 1 4 .  William ] .  Baumol, On the Theory of the Expansion of the Fin , 52 AM.  EcoN. REv. 1 078 
( 1 962) . 
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ing with "satisficing" as the behavior pattern. 115 
1495 
While in some respects critical of management, institutionalist liter­
ature had a supportive aspect. It afforded a cost justification: The 
management corporation produced goods more cheaply than could 
disaggregated producers in a classical economic universe; management 
corporations produced and competed effectively, if not efficiently in the 
narrow sense.116 The lack of direct controls on management, either by 
the price system or by the capital markets, did not necessarily present a 
serious problem. Growth was the mark of successful enterprise and 
successful managing. Managers sought it, and strong institutional pres­
sures from investors and peers encouraged them to do so. 1 1 7 This 
"growth bias" left managers close enough to classical profit 
maximizers.1 1 8  
Economic theory also explained why the investment community 
viewed management's pursuit of the growth objective with equanimity. 
The theory of present value, advanced by Irving Fisher in 1930, aligned 
management's long-term investment perspectives with capital's often 
short-term investment perspectives. Since growth ultimately raised the 
level of dividend return, it manifested itself in present capital apprecia­
tion, that is, a higher stock price.1 1 9  Thus, long-term industrial stability 
and short-term profit came into balance,120 or so it seemed.121 
Meanwhile, a separate discipline within economics-neoclassical ec­
onomics-continued to operate in the classical tradition. Prior to the 
appearance of the new economic theory of the firm in the 1970s, how­
ever, neoclassical microeconomists declined to theorize about the inter­
nal operations of the management corporation, restricting their 
attention to the market. 1 22 Their models explained coordination of the 
1 1 5 .  RICHARD M .  CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM ( 1 963) .  
For a short summary o f  this l i terature, see M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 50,  a t  20. 
1 1 6 .  See generally Wn.LIAM J. BAUMOL, BusiNESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH ( 1 959) ; 
ROBIN MARRIS, THE EcoNOMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM ( 1 964 ) ;  Buxbaum, supra 
note 22 ,  at 522-24 . 
1 1 7 .  See A. CHANDLER, supra note 53 ,  at 484-500; Edward S .  Herman, The Limits of the 
Market as a Discipline in Co1porate Govemance, 9 DEL. J .  CoRP. L. 530, 533-34 ( 1 984) .  Chandler 
finds a close relationship between the push for growth and the development of the multidivi­
sional firm. The desire for firm security from disruption of supplies or outlets results in 
growth through vertical integration. Multidivisional growth also is productive: The conglom­
erate firm adding a unit of production causes better use of the new unit. A. CHANDLER, supra 
note 53 ,  at 486. 
1 1 8.  This is Herman's thesis .  E.  HERMAN, supra note I l l , at  1 06- 1 3; Herman, Sllpra note 
l l 7 , a t 533 .  
1 1 9 .  IRVING FISHER,  THE THEORY OF INTEREST ( 1 930) ;  see also A. BERLE & G. M EANS, 
supra note 60, at 24 7-48. On dividend policy, see John Lintner, Distributions of Incomes of Corpo­
rations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes, 46 AM. EcoN. REv. 97 (May 1 956) (papers 
& proceedings) ;  see also RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 1 0- 1 5  (2d ed. 1 984) .  
1 20 .  See A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 1 0, 4 73-74, 492; J .  HuRST, supra note 54 , at 82.  
1 2 1 .  For an account of the disruption of this balance in the 1 980s, see text accompany­
ing notes 2 1 5-22 1 infra. 
1 22 .  The neoclassical models' assumptions of costlessly created and enforced contracts 
and perfect information obviated the need to inquire into organizational structure. See Jen-
'Uillil1' _______ _ 
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use of resources and distribution of income by the price system.123 
They employed the received model of the single-product firm operat­
ing in a static but highly competitive environment. This firm was 
owned by a single proprietor who strived to maximize profits, using 
only output and price as strategic variables.124 This approach reduced 
the firm to a "black box"-a "production function" deemed to follow 
profit considerations exclusively and behave as an entity in rational pat­
terns no different from those of human actors. Managerial power, if it 
existed at all, was assumed to be effectively controlled by market 
forces.125 
In the age of the management corporation, this limited inquiry 
made neoclassical microeconomics a discipline of obviously limited ex­
planatory capabilities.126 Yet microeconomists did not perceive a 
debilitating problem and rush to expand their models. They thought of 
actions inside firms as "engineering"-functions of hierarchical struc­
tures-and therefore not a subject matter suited to a discipline that 
studies markets.127 The neoclassicists' hierarchical conception of inter­
nal firm affairs signified concurrence in the managerialist conception 
prevalent among the institutionalists and academic lawyers.128 
sen, supra note 8, at 325-26; see also Nathan Rosenberg, Comments on Robert Hessen, "The :vtodern 
Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, " 26 J .L. & EcoN. 29 1 ,  295 ( 1 983) . 
1 23 .  See Steven N.S .  Cheung, The Contractual Xature of the Firm, 26  J .L. & EcoN. 1 ,  1 8  
( 1 983) .  
Following Adam Smith's dictum that the division of labor, and thus the firm, establishes 
the boundaries of the market for analytical purposes, see A. CHANDLER, supra note 53,  at 489-
90, neoclassical economists did not look at production processes inside the firm or at the 
contracting arrangements underlying them. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and 
the Theory of the Finn, 26 J .L .  & EcoN. 375 ,  377-78 ( 1 983) .  
1 24 .  MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY oF EcoNOMICs 1 75-86 ( 1 980) . 
1 25 .  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 1 2 1 ,  1 35 ( 1 962) ;  see a/so jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 4, at 306; Williamson, supra note 45 ,  at 1 220-2 1 .  Neoclassical models 
avoided taking entrepreneurship and its concomitant, profit, into account through single­
minded adherence to the concept of marginal productivity. In perfect conditions, entrepre­
neurs theoretically have no function and receive no income. Profits thus were conceived in 
terms of imperfect competition and disequilibrium conditions, and explained either as pay­
ment for the assumption of uninsurable risks or as temporary windfalls .  See Paul J .  McNulty, 
On the Xature and Theory of Economic Organization: The Role of the Firm Reconsidered, 16 H IST . PoL 
EcoN. 240-4 1 ( 1 984) .  
Neoclassical theory valued production b y  small traditional enterprises subj ect t o  the in­
visible hand. Production by internal adminis trative coordination is suboptimal because of the 
absence of perfect competition. These values prove unexpectedly complementary to those 
reflected in the anti-managerialist discourse in the legal academy. Both accept the hierarchi­
cal nature of the corporation and both question the legitimacy of management power, albeit 
from different points of view. 
1 26. For criticism of the neoclassical model, see M .  BLAUG, supra note 1 24 ,  at  1 76-78; A. 
CHANDLER, supra note 53 ,  at 489-9 1 ;  RONALD CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 5-6 
( 1 988) ; Harold Demsetz, Theory of the Finn Revisited, 4 J .L . EcoN. & 0RG. 1 4 1 ,  1 42-44 ( 1 988) ;  
McNul ty,  supra note 1 25 ;  Nordquist ,  The Breakup of the :vtaximization Pn.nciple, in READINGS IN 
MICROECONOMICS 278 (D .  Kamerschen ed. 1 965) ;  Sidney G.  Winter, On Coase, Competence, and 
the Corporation, 4 J .L. EcoN. & 0RG. 1 63 ,  1 65-7 1 ( 1 988) . 
1 27 .  See Meckling, supra note 3 1 ,  at 557 .  
1 28. The widely differing perspectives clashed mostly over questions of antitrust policy 
and law. 
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2. Managerialist law. 
Berle and Means also contributed a political picture of the manage­
ment corporation which prevailed in academic legal discussions until 
the new economic theory of the firm appeared to challenge it around 
1 980.  As already stated in part I, 129 this political picture identified 
management as a powerful group. This power stemmed from corpo­
rate structure: The traditional legal model of corporate ownership had 
combined with passive, widespread securityholding to leave manage­
ment in a strategic position. The result was real power at the top of a 
dependent structure, 130 and the issue was management legitimacy. 
The debate over management legitimacy included one issue stated 
in terms of traditional legal theory. This issue-whether the corpora­
tion was public or private-addressed the validity of government regu­
lation. A century earlier, concession theory would have justified 
regulation. But concession had fallen out of currency; its imagery no 
longer made sense. 131 Accordingly, advocates of regulation reformu­
lated the political assertions bound up in concession theory. They 
abandoned the sovereign creation story and accepted the primacy of 
individual creativity and energy in corporate life. But they character­
ized the product of all this individual activity as "public" in nature. 
This characterization supported the position that uncontrolled man­
agement wielded its power illegitimately and should be subjected to 
additional legal controls. The contrary "private" characterization af­
firmed the legitimacy of vesting in management substantial discretion. 
Anti-managerialists demonstrated the firm's public nature by analo­
gizing managerial power to governmental power. Like government, 
large corporations took actions important to those outside of the or­
ganization. Like government authorities, managers exercised their 
power by means of a rationalized system of control and administration. 
Like the government, the "public" firm was a "political" entity.132 
Political theories respecting government, such as interest group plural­
ism, therefore should be applied to it. 1 33 
1 29. See text accompanying notes 1 8-2 1 supra. 
1 30 .  A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 60, at 244-52 ,  309- 1 3 ; see also Herman, supra note 
1 1 7 ,  at  530-33 .  
1 3 1 .  Bratton, supra note  I 7,  a t  
1 32 .  See Earl Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CoRPORATION IN  MODERN 
SociETY 2 1 8  (E. Mason ed. 1 966) ; R. NADER, M.  GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, a t  33 ,  
36-37.  Anti-managerialist commentary written instead in  the post-Realist proceduralist tradi­
tion declines to make the "public" and "political" assertion. See M ELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CoRPORATION 16 ( 1 976) (corporate law is "constitutional"-that is ,  i t  
"regulates the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted" ) .  
1 33 .  The analytical framework o f  interest group pluralism prevalent during the post-war 
period was so applied. Cj Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 1 30 U.  
PA. L. REv . 1423 ,  1 427  ( 1 982) (describing changing views of the  public interest) . 
The anti-managerialists underpinned their "public" and "political" assertions with a his­
torical story. Generations of law students have been introduced to the subject of corporations 
through this story as retold in the first chapter of WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARoN EISEN-
. .. ,� Ul· --------
,;, w 
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The "public" theme also figured into doctrinal fairness jurispru­
dence. Corporate doctrine follows the trust model in name only. In 
practice, it leaves substantial room for self-interested conduct by corpo­
rate managers. Anti-managerialists drew on the analogy to government 
in their criticism of the doctrine's managerialist bias. Our system nor­
mally treats public offices as trusts. We require public officers to show 
respect for others, even-handedness, and selflessness in situations in 
which we leave private persons unregulated.134 Given these assump­
tions, a "public" model of corporations implies strict scrutiny of the 
managerial actions affecting the interests of investors.135 
E. The Contemporary Debate-The New Economic Theory Versus 
Af anagerialism 
With the new economic theory, neoclassical microeconomists sur­
mounted the conceptual barriers that prevented them from elaborating 
a modern theory of corporate structure.136 The solution was simple. 
The new theory avoided direct consideration of hierarchies in manage­
ment corporations, setting out a picture in which corporate entity and 
hierarchy were irrelevant. By describing all internal relationships as 
market transactions, the theory permitted large organizations to be dis­
cussed within the traditions of neoclassical microeconomics. No ac­
knowledgment of "engineering" sullied the theorists' hands. 
BERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRPORATIONS 1 - 1 5  (5th ed. 1 980) ; see also R .  NADER, M .  
GREEN & J .  SELIGMAN, supra note 20, a t  36-37 ,  62-65 ( a  nice telling o f  the story) . I n  the early 
1 9th century, corporate formation was a matter of special chartering by state legislatures. In  
those days, legal doctrine treated corporate power as  a concession of  sovereignty. Then, dur­
ing the course of the n ineteenth century, special chartering waned and then disappeared. 
Insofar as i t  promoted equal access to the corporate form, this was a salutary development. 
Unfortunately, dark forces took control around the turn of the century. S tates ceded legal 
control to management groups in exchange for tax dollars. These bad faith transactions per­
mitted corporations to escape their historical duty to serve public ends, even as corporations 
continued to derive their constituent and legitimizing power from the s tate and to share i ts 
sovereignty. See Latham, supra note 1 32 ,  at 223;  see generally Jacobson ,  supra note 58 .  
1 34 .  See Christopher Stone, Co1porate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinc­
tions :v!atter?, 1 30 U. PA . L. REv. 1 44 1 ,  1 449, 1 480 ( 1 982) .  
1 35 .  This  movement gathered force in the 1 960s, eclipsing the managerial i s t  expertise­
based approach. In  the 1 970s, anti-managerialists dominated the law reviews .  Despite this, 
s tate corporate law remained substantially pro-managerial into the 1 980s. 
The literature on transfers of control provides a good example of this phenomenon. Aca­
demics argued s trongly against the legitimacy of managers exchanging control power for 
money. See, e.g. , William D. Andrews,  The Stockholder 's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of 
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv . 505 ( 1 965) ;  Adolf A .  Berle, Jr . ,  "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLUM.  
L. REV. 1 2 1 2  ( 1 958) . A few cases took up the  idea. See Rosenfeld v .  Black, 445 F .2d 1 337  (2d 
Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) ; Perlman v. Feldmann, 2 1 9  F .2d 1 73 (2d Cir. 1 955) .  But  academic criticism was 
never fully incorporated into doctrine; most judges saw nothing wrong with the practice. See 
Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1 259 (4th Cir. 1 978) ; Essex Universal v. Yates, 305 F .2d 572  
(2d Cir. 1 962) ; Honigman v. Green Giant Co . ,  208  F. Supp . 754  (D. Minn .  1 96 1 ) ,  a.ff 'd, 309 
F.2d 667 (8th Cir.  1 962) ,  cert. denied, 372 U.S. 94 1 ( 1 963) ; Easterbrook & Fischel , Corporate 
Control Transactions, supra note 22 ,  at 7 1 6. 
Despite this general trend, a few anti-managerial innovations have come into corporate 
doctrine during the present decade. See note 235 infra . 
1 36 .  See text accompanying notes 1 22- 1 28 supra . 
July 1 989] THEOR Y OF THE FIRM 1 499 
The neoclassical new economic theory pronounced a new solution 
to the problem of the split entrepreneurial function. Where turn-of­
the-century corporate realism patched over the split with a unified, real 
corporate being, the new economic theory offered the converse solu­
tion of a completely deconstructed corporate entity. Since no cogniza­
ble corporate collectivity appears amidst the nexus of contracts, no 
tension arises between collective and individual interests. The new the­
ory does not look for corporate replication of individual profit-maxi­
mizing. The entrepreneurial function emerges in separate but unified 
pieces among the aggregated individuals. Ironically, this solution 
draws on the same classical tradition that originally stated the problem. 
With this market-based solution, the neoclassicists rebutted both 
the managerialists' statement of the corporate problem and their regu­
latory solutions. The neoclassical picture privileges the firm's aggre­
gate parts almost absolutely, deconstructing the hierarchy that the anti­
managerialists attack. The managerialist corporate entity almost disap­
pears, dissolving into disaggregated but interworking transactions 
among the participating actors. All of these interworking firm transac­
tions resemble one another.137 The "separation of ownership and con­
trol," on which the managerialist picture based management power, no 
longer matters. "Ownership" becomes as irrelevant a concept as "firm 
entity." The "firm" is only a series of contracts covering inputs being 
joined so as to become output. "Capital," and thus the traditional legal 
situs of ownership, devolves into one of the many types of inputs.138 
Though the neoclassicists nominally made these moves for the pur­
pose of explanation, their operative assumptions gave the theory a nor­
mative aspect. Treating hierarchy as if it does not exist offers 
wonderful support to those at the top of the hierarchy, so long as the 
treatment implies no concomitant reordering of the status quo. More­
over, by challenging the anti-managerialist critique of corporate law, 139 
the neoclassicists in some respects challenge the status quo in manage­
ment's favor. They rebut the anti-managerialists' "public" characteri­
zation with a model of "private" contracts among successfully 
contracting market actors. "Concessions" of sovereign authority have 
no place in this picture of free contract. 
By stripping the content from the firm entity and introducing the 
self-interested rational economic actor, the new theory also rebuts the 
concept of fiduciary duty. Legal duties of selflessness do not figure into 
1 37 .  Some transactions have the firm entity as a party, but only as a matter of conven­
:ence. The "firm" in the picture has no precise boundaries-unlike legal academics, the ne­
)classicists have no interest in categorizing transactions as occurring "inside" or "outside" of 
:he firm. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4,  at 3 1 1 ;  Klein, supra note 38, at 373; Klein, 
:::rawford & Alchian, supra note 45, at 326. 
1 38. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 25,  at  78 1 -83 ,  789 n . l 4  (owners contract for 
:ights to anticipated residual awards) .  
1 39 .  See generally sources cited in note 22  supra ; Winter, supra note 9 ;  Nicholas Wolfson, A 
�ritique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 959 ( 1 980) . 
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the neoclassicists' conception of bilateral contract relations. 140 These 
market contracts implicitly justify what they depict: Since they are 
priced to take management self-interest into account, extant customs of 
managerial self-dealing therefore must be all right, or cost competition 
would have caused them to disappear long ago. None of this was lost 
on participants in the corporate governance debates of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. To one anti-managerialist observer, the new eco­
nomic theory completes the twentieth century trend toward loosened 
fiduciary restraints and enhanced management discretion.141 In fact, 
management spokespersons did make dramatic use of the theory in the 
early 1980s142 to protest the first draft of the American Law Institute's 
Principles of Corporate Governance. 143 
The institutionalists, with their roots in managerialism, developed a 
variant of contractualism which does not offer an absolute solution to 
the split in the entrepreneurial function. The opportunistic conduct 
and bounded rationality of their actors leave room for tensions be­
tween individuals and corporate collectives that do not self-resolve. 
Nonetheless, like the neoclassicists, their work offers normative com­
fort to management interests. They legitimize the received hierarchical 
picture of the management corporation 144 as a contractual arrange­
ment which minimizes transaction costs. Their picture also makes the 
corporation a "private" phenomenon. They affirm the corporate struc­
ture and management's place in it, even as they admit the possibility of 
contract failure. 
Some of the new economic theory's initial success in the legal acad­
emy may be attributable to this support of management. The new eco­
nomic theory brought academic theory into line with the practices of 
corporate doctrine. The academic line had stressed managerial public 
duty and legal constraint. Corporate doctrine equivocated; it repeated 
the fiduciary principle and maintained a governmental presence even as 
it steadfastly protected the management corporation's private law bases 
and the discretionary authority of managers. Management power had 
supporters in academia as well as opponents. Supporters saw a volun­
tary side to individual relations with corporations, and the new eco-
1 40. See Bratton, supra note 17, at _. 
1 4 1 .  Brudney, supra note 22, at  1 4 1 0. 
1 42 .  See STATEMENT OF THE BuSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW I NSTITUTE'S 
PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GovERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REc­
OMMENDATIONs" 3-5 ( 1 983 ) ;  Paul W.  MacAvoy, Scott  Cantor, jim Dana & Sara Peck,  ALI Pro­
posals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board of Directors: An Economic Analysis, in id. at 
C- 1 (Exhibit C) .  
1 43 .  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOM­
MENDATIONS (Tent .  Draft No.  I ,  1 982) . The ALI's draft was based on prevalent anti-manager­
ialist assumptions. 
1 44 .  Indeed, the institutionalist picture is derived from the historical work of Alfred 
Chandler. See generally Williamson, The .\1oden1 Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, supra 
note 42.  
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nomic theory articulated this perception. 1 45 
F. Summary 
In the classical world of the early nineteenth century, economic 
practice and theory coexisted in peace. Corporate production was an 
anomalous feature of the economic landscape. The corporation was 
integrated into the classical picture by a limiting theory-it was a legal 
institution only. But as the century proceeded and corporate produc­
tion became the norm, it became clear that the corporate firm was more 
than a legal institution. The entrepreneurial function became split in 
economic practice, and the classical peace ended. Legal theory offered 
two opposing solutions. One, contractualism, sought to minimize the 
split and protect the individual by suppressing the corporation. The 
other, realism, made the split irrelevant by transcending the individual 
interest with a spiritual firm entity. Neither solution wore well in the 
twentieth century. 
In the twentieth century, the management corporation became a 
normal institution. But the classical reproach continued to influence 
theoretical perspectives. With managerialism, the split entrepreneurial 
function became the base point of both economic and legal theory. 
Nineteenth century individualism, however, did not dominate manager­
ialist responses to the classically-stated problem. In the ongoing dis­
course of legitimization, individual, bilateral relations within corporate 
entities were obscured amidst the concepts and habits of social policy­
making. In legal theory, the individualist impulse remained largely 
subordinated until the appearance of the new economic theory. With 
this new theory, twentieth century individualists integrated classical 
theory and twentieth century practice. This theory offered a return to a 
world of classical peace: It healed the split entrepreneurial function 
and returned the corporate entity to limited life as a legal institution. 
III. THE NoNEVOLUTIONARY HISTORY oF THE DocTRINAL THEORY .oF 
THE CoRPORATE FIRM 
A second, nonevolutionary history of the theory of the corporate 
firm parallels the foregoing evolutionary account. It deals with the 
same juridical concepts, but it shows that, when deployed to support 
corporate doctrine, these concepts have remained substantially con­
stant in history. This account looks only to corporate doctrine, drawing 
on the definitions of the firm operative in treatises and other doctrinal 
work from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. These 
sources state a "doctrinal theory of the corporate firm" that was formu-
1 45 .  This recognition of a historical contribution should not be taken as an assertion 
that the new economic theory accurately modeled corporate legal practice. If we were to take 
the neoclassical variant as system and follow it as an absolute guide. we soon would be recon­
structing rather than recreating the practice. 
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lated during the early period and lasted into the twentieth century. The 
theory survived the late nineteenth and early twentieth century discus­
sions of realism and contractualism-they proceeded around it, but did 
not cause its alteration. It again survived when juridical theory of the 
firm discourse lost credibility around 1930-the mid-twentieth century 
writers changed the vocabulary, but restated the historical concepts. It 
continues to inform corporate doctrine today. 
This account shows that as the focus of attention shifts from theory 
to practice, historical tensions between individualism and the demands 
of collective enterprise ease. The doctrine mediates the tensions. It 
amalgamates the theoretical alternatives, averting controversy by bal­
ancing the variant points of view advanced in more purely theoretical 
contexts. Thus, the doctrinal theory of the firm is capacious. And it 
appears to have performed a useful function: As a base of agreement 
on basic conceptions, it has permitted corporate law decisionmakers to 
subordinate theoretical concerns and look to the particulars of situa­
tions in deciding cases.146 To the extent the doctrinal theory embodies 
values, they are those of the traditional corporate practitioner, rather 
than those of the legal or economic theorist, or those of the corporate 
chief executive officer or the Wall Street investment banker. To the 
practitioner, corporate law facilitates the activities of others in a regu­
lated context. To achieve this, the law integrates concepts that in isola­
tion would be in tension with one another. 
A. The Angell and Ames Definition 
The doctrinal theory of the firm may be traced, in America, to An­
gell and Ames, 147 the leading antebellum corporate law treatise. 1 48 
Angell and Ames dealt with the problem of devising a theoretical char­
acterization of the corporation by drawing on definitions from three 
prominent works.149 One definition came from Kent's Commentaries , 150 
but had origins going as far back as the writings of Pope Innocent 
1 46 .  Both the historical definitions of the firm and the post- 1 930  reconstructions de­
scribe business organizations and their legal structure. All of the treatise writers employ an 
essentialist methodology in defining the corporation. The observer looks at events and pro­
ceeds by inductive enumeration until the universal in the events, their essence, has been 
grasped. The essence becomes the definition of the phenomenon. See M. BLAUG ,  supra note 
1 24 ,  at 1 25 .  Since by the turn of the century the corporation included everything from the 
. 
1. ' . ,  
;r . 
corner grocery s tore to the largest management corporation, the historical definition took on :, 
considerable breadth. While capturing a broad essence, the writers explicitly defer most nor-
mative considerations to other contexts. This pragmatic move away from theoretical domi- r' i 
nance illustrates corporate doctrine in its facilitative mode. Both the doctrine and the theory 
underlying i t  provide legal structures to accomplish ends formulated by policymakers . 
1 47 .  josEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS 
AGGREGATE (9th ed. 1 8 7 1 ) .  
1 48. See Horwitz, supra note 1 4 ,  a t  2 1 5 . 
1 49 .  J .  ANGELL & S. AMES, supra note 1 47,  at 1 .  
1 50 .  2 jAMES KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 303 ( l i th ed. 1 866) . Kent's defi­
nition had been incorporated into the Louisiana Civil Code from 1 825 through 1 987 .  LA. 
Civ. ConE ANN. ,  art. 427 (West 1 952 & Supp. 1 989) (repealed in 1 987) .  
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IV. 1 5 1  The second came from Kyd's late eighteenth century British 
treatise on corporate law . 1 52 The third was the famous description of 
the corporation in Chief justice Marshall's opinion in the Dartmouth Col­
lege case.153 This section closely examines each of these three texts. 
First, the definition Angell and Ames drew from Chancellor Kent: 
A corporation is [an artificial and fictitious] l 54 body, created by law, 
composed of individuals united under a common name, the members 
of which succeed each other, so that the body continues the same, 
notwithstanding the change of individuals who compose it ,  and is ,  for 
certain purposes,  considered as a natural person. 1 5 5  
This definition begins with an anti-realist conception of the nature of 
the corporation: Artificial bodies156 are reifications. The phrase "cre­
ated by law" brings in the notion that the corporate reification 
originates as a concession from the state; implicitly, the creating law is 
positive law. But the definition balances this implication with an anti­
positivist conception of firm life: While the state creates the reification, 
the corporation is "composed of individuals." Here the definition also 
makes an oblique reference to the firm's aggregate aspect. The refer­
ence does not go so far as to ascribe "contractual" origins to the corpo­
ration in a legal sense, but in an economic sense it can be taken to 
locate the source of creative energy in individuals, rather than in the 
state. The definition's image of the corporate body remaining the same 
while individual members succeed each other ascribes content to the 
firm reification; something separate from the individuals exists. 
The definition's final, uncontroversial point-that the corporation is 
considered a natural person for certain purposes-is noteworthy for its 
careful anti-realism. The corporation is a person for doctrinal pur­
poses only, being classified with individuals in some doctrinal contexts 
even though it is not a natural person. The Supreme Court has fol­
lowed this situational practice in dealing with questions of corporate 
constitutional rights for more than a century. 157 
1 5 1 .  Timberg, supra note 92,  at 540. According to Conard, it may not have been Pope 
Innocent IV but rather one of his editors who recognized in an introduction that corporations 
are both material and immaterial, that they have individual members , but that corporations as 
a whole are not natural but intellectual. See ALFRED CoNARD,  CoRPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 
4 1 7  & n .5  ( 1 976) (quoting Baldus Ubaldi, in " Index" to Innocenti us, Com men/aria , sub. tit .  
[/nlversitas, the text credited with the origination of fiction theory) .  
1 52 .  I STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 13  ( 1 793) .  
1 53 .  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 7  U .S .  (4 Wheat . )  5 1 8 , 636 ( 1 8 1 9) .  
1 54 .  2 J. KENT, supra note 1 50, at 303-04. 
1 55 .  J .  ANGELL & S. AMES , supra note 1 47 ,  at I (footnote added) .  
1 56 .  !d. at 4 .  Angell and Ames use this and other terms to capture Kent's point. 
1 57 .  See First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti ,  435 U .S .  765 ( 1 978) (corporations accorded first 
amendment rights) ;  Hale v.  Henkel, 20 l U.S. 43, 68-83 ( 1 906) (corporations accorded fourth 
amendment rights but not fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege) ;  Minneapolis & St. L. 
Ry. v.  Beckwith, 1 29 U.S .  26, 28 ( 1 889) (corporations accorded fourteenth amendment due 
process rights) ; Santa Clara Co. v .  Southern Pac. R .R . ,  1 1 8 U .S .  394 ( 1 886) (corporations 
accorded equal protection rights) ; Bank of Augusta v.  Earle, 38 U.S .  ( 1 3  Pet . )  5 1 9 ,  587-92 
( 1 839) (corporations not citizens within privileges and immunities clause of art. IV) . 
I{ 
1 504 STANFORD LA W REVIE W [Vol. 4 1 : 1 4 7 1 
Second, the Kyd definition: 
A corporation, or a body politic, or body incorporate, i s  a collection of 
many individuals,  united into one body, under a special denomination, 
having perpetual succession under an artificial form,  and vested, by the 
policy of law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects , as an indi­
vidual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obli­
gations ,  of suing and being sued, of enj oying privileges and immunities 
in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights , more or less 
extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the p owers con­
ferred upon it ,  either at the time of its creation, or at  any subsequent 
period of its existence. 1 58 
Kyd leans to the corporation's aggregate aspect more than does Kent. 
We get the same image of united individuals, but Kyd fixes on the idea 
of a "denomination" to describe the firm. He thus limits the firm en­
tity's substance to the common name of the collection of individuals. 1 59 
Kyd acknowledges positive law aspects of firm creation, but he deem­
phasizes concession theory. His definition includes the point about 
contextual treatment of the corporation as if it were an individual. He 
then restates the point more broadly, leaving out any assertion that the 
state creates the firm reification. In sum, Kyd minimizes the signifi­
cance of both the corporate entity and state participation in corporate 
life. His corporation is a legal device that facilitates common action. 
The substance lies with individual contributions. 
Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's discussion: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it  pos­
s esses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These 
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it 
was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the 
expression may be allowed, individuality . . . .  Its immortality no more 
confers on it political power, or a political character, than immortality 
would confer such power or character on a natural person.  It is no 
more a state instrument, than a natural person exercising the same 
powers would be. 1 60 
Chief Justice Marshall's first sentence, the foundation citation for early 
nineteenth century "fiction theory," depicts the corporation as a reifica­
tion and presents a concession theory of its origin. The second and 
third sentences, noting the corporation's limited powers, set out the 
conception undergirding ultra vires doctrine. But the operative concep­
tion may be characterized more broadly. These sentences offer a func­
tionalist conception of the corporation: Its powers have purposes; they 
1 58 .  I S. Kvo, supra note 1 52 ,  at 1 3 . 
1 59 .  The new economic theories of the firm make a similar move when they s trip the 
entity down to a contracting nexus.  See text accompanying notes 28-40 supra. 
1 60 .  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 7  U .S .  (4 Wheat . )  5 1 8 , 636 ( 1 8 1 9) .  
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are means to ends. This functionalism follows from Chief Justice Mar­
shall's anti-realist conception: Since the corporation is not a natural 
person it has no ability to formulate its own purposes and follow them. 
Less than a person, it is only a means to prescribed ends. 
Chief Justice Marshall's comments on corporate immortality and 
"political power" were directed to the application of the contract clause 
of the constitution to the Dartmouth College charter, the issue disputed 
in the case. He moves toward a contractual ruling by utilizing the pub­
lic/private distinction and finding the corporation, in substance, to be 
private-the corporation's legal foundations should not lead it to be 
treated in law as a government department it does not otherwise resem­
ble.161 Here Chief Justice Marshall recognizes that the corporation in­
cludes voluntary private relations, and balances a concession 
conception with contractualism. 
Significant commonalities tie the three definitions together, despite 
their variant vocabularies and emphases. Each definition conceives of 
the corporation as a reification, finding reality in the actions of individ­
ual participants. Each simultaneously recognizes entity and aggregate 
characteristics, concession and contractual origins, and public and pri­
vate aspects. Which aspect proves relevant in a given situation depends 
on the facts and the particular observer's perspective. Kent and Chief 
Justice Marshall may be distinguished from Kyd for stronger emphasis 
on the entity. Kyd permits virtually nothing in the way of determinate 
thought structures inside his corporate entity, and Kyd's lesser empha­
sis on concession follows from his treatment of the entity: The less 
content in the entity, the less practical significance attaches to the 
state's act of creating it. 
Professor Conard wrote a decade ago that the theory of the firm 
tends to be relevant to the placement of corporations in a legal order 
whose sentences speak in terms of human beings.162 If we take Angell 
and Ames's collection of definitions as a theory of the firm, then we 
should have low expectations of its ability to fulfill this ordering func­
tion. The definitions almost determinedly lack concepts that promise 
to determine results in concrete situations. In effect, they tell us that 
doctrinal principles and policies stem from particular juridical contexts 
rather than from the corporation's intrinsic nature. 
In the same passage, Conard scrutinized the definitions from Angell 
and Ames, attacking their fiction and invisibility notions. Modern firms, 
he said, have a real presence, as individuals and labor united for eco­
nomic purposes. We should, he said, follow Europeans to find a social 
reality beyond the juridical reality, looking to the social facts of group 
coherence and discipline.163 Conard refought an old battle here, but it 
1 6 1 .  See Mark, supra note 66, at 1 448-50. 
1 62 .  A. CoNARD, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 44 1 .  
1 63 .  /d. at 442. 
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is worth pointing out that these historical definitions, carefully read, 
contain nothing to interfere with the search for corporate social reality. 
Kent, Kyd, and Chief Justice Marshall each recognize the corporation 
as a confluence of social reality and juridical construct, and balance 
both components as they attempt to capture its essence. Had the field 
of vision of any of the three included the elaborate hierarchy of the 
management corporation, his definition could have accommodated it 
without any fundamental reconstruction of operative concepts. 
B. Usage of the Angell and Ames Definition Prior to 1 93 0  
The Angell and Ames definition, or in some cases one or two of its 
three components, became standard matter. The succeeding century's 
corporate law treatises repeated it again and again.164 The definition �· 
even can be found, stated as living legal doctrine, in a treatise pub-
lished in 1958.165 
Taking this usage as evidence of an enduring doctrinal conception 
of the corporation raises questions. One can imagine generations of 
treatise writers repeating an old text again and again without evaluating 
its plausibility anew. Doubtless some repetition of that sort has oc­
curred here. Absent indications that the writers thought carefully 
about the theory of the firm when repeating the Angell and Ames defi-
nition, one would be justified in finding its persistence without signifi-
cance. But these texts offer a great deal of evidence of reflection and 
considered affirmance of the definition's construct. The definition 
therefore may be taken as a constant doctrinal theory of the corporate 
firm. 
The writers adjusted the Angell and Ames formula as corporate 
doctrine changed. For example, the late nineteenth century texts 
tended to drop the immortality point. Unlimited corporate life, pre-
1 64 .  BouviER's LAw DICTIONARY 3 1 8  (7th ed. 1 857) ; GEoRGE FIELD, PRIVATE CoRPORA­
TIONS 1 -4 ( 1 877) (Kyd and Marshall variants ) ;  I PLATT POTTER, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoR­
PORATIONS 1 -4 ( 1 879) ; I C.  BEACH ,  supra note 82, at 3-4 ( 1 89 1 ) ;  I CARL SPELLING, LAw oF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 3-4 ( 1 892) ;  HENRY TAYLOR, LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (3d ed.  
1 894) ;  WILLIAM CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CoRPORATIONS 4-5 ( 1 897)  ( Kent variant ) ;  
WILLIAM WILSON CooK, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoRPORATIONS (4 th ed. 1 898) ( Marshall 
variant and cases ) ;  HERBERT MARCUS ADLER, A SuMMARY OF THE LAw RELATING TO CoRPORA­
TIONS 1 -4 ( 1 903) (Kyd variant); LESLIE TOMPKINS ,  A SuMMARY oF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CoRPO­
RATIONS 6 ( 1 904) (Kent, Marshall, and Kyd variants) ; RICHARD HARVEY, A HANDBOOK OF 
CoRPORATION LAw 7-8 ( 1 906) ; joN T. MuLLIGAN, LAw oF CoRPORATIONS 7 ( 1 9 1 3) ;  josEPH 
FRANCE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 3-4 (2d ed. 1 9 1 4) ;  iSAAC WORMSER,  LAW OF PRIVATE 
CoRPORATIONS 3-4 ( 1 92 1 ) ; jAMES TREAT CARTER, THE NATURE oF THE CoRPORATION AS A 
LEGAL ENTITY 37-38 ( 1 9 1 9) (Doctoral thesis, Johns Hopkins Univ.) (Marshall, Kyd, and Kent 
variants ) ;  CHARLES B.  ELLIOTT, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1 923) (Kyd and 
Marshall variants ) ;  HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE ,  BALLANTINE's MANUAL OF CORPORATION 
LAw AND PRACTICE 6 ( 1 930) (Kyd and Marshall variants) ;  WILLIAM CRow, FoRMAL CoRPORATE 
PRACTICE ( 1 93 1 )  (Marshall variant) ; BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 438 (3d ed. 1 933 )  (Kyd and 
Marshall variants ) .  
1 65 .  I HowARD 0LECK, MoDERN CoRPORATION LAW § 2 ( 1 958) . 
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sumably, had become an unremarkable doctrinal assumption.166 The 
late nineteenth century texts also mentioned the decline of concession 
theory and the passing of the fiction notion. One writer did this even as 
he cited Chief Justice Marshall with approval for the rest of his firm 
conception.167 Another writer, making the same point about conces­
sion and fiction, indicated a preference for K yd.168 Late nineteenth 
century writers also took the trouble to note explicitly that the received 
definition renders the corporation as an entity and an aggregate 
both.169 One writer expressed dissatisfaction with the theoretical unti­
diness of the simultaneous presence of both concepts, accusing Angell 
and Ames of being contradictory and incorrect. That writer then ad­
mitted that practice required continued sufferance of this theoretical 
contradiction. 170 
Modifications continued after the turn of the century. Writers in­
cluded the governance model of the liberal incorporation statutes next 
to the historical definitions. This move provided the reified entity with 
some additional substance, but otherwise left the Angell and Ames con­
ceptions unchanged.171 In his 1 9 1 3  treatise, Wormser offered an effec­
tive and modern reformulation of the Angell and Ames combination. 
He rendered entity, aggregate, concession, and individual initiative 
concepts in one clean sentence: "In the last analysis it would seem 
most accurate to define a corporation as a group of persons authorized 
by sovereign authority to act as a legal unit." 172 
The historical definitions also figured into the debates over realism 
and contractualism. The leading participants in the debate, Freund for 
corporate realism and Morawetz for contractualism, both commented 
on them, finding Kyd's definition preferable. Although none of the 
definitions offered Freund any authority for the realism point, he found 
Kyd's antipositivism useful as authority refuting the fiction and conces­
sion notions. Freund commented that Kyd substitutes a conception of 
collective capacity. Morawetz preferred Kyd's definition for its aggre­
gateness as well as its antipositivism. Morawetz objected to Chief Jus­
tice Marshall's emphasis on fiction and concession notions, and also his 
entity thinking. To Morawetz the corporation was a fiction, but not the 
"fiction" of Chief Justice Marshall's conception. Rather, the corpora­
tion's rights and duties were those of the persons composing it and not 
1 66 .  1 C.  SPELLING, supra note 1 64 ,  at 3-4. 
1 67 .  !d. 
1 68 .  1 C. BEACH, supra note 82, at 3-4 . 
1 69 .  !d. ; H .  TAYLOR, supra note 82, at 1 5 . 
1 70 .  H. TAYLOR,  supra note 82, at 1 5  n. l .  Taylor puts Kent and Blackstone on the entity 
side, and lines up Kyd with Jay Gould, who wrote on the subject. !d. 
1 7 1 .  J .  MULLICAN, supra note 1 64 ,  at 7 .  
1 72 .  I .  WoRMSER, supra note 1 64 ,  at 4 ;  see also J .  MULLICAN, supra note 1 64 ,  at 7 (defining 
a corporation as "a collection of many individuals,  united into one body, having perpetual 
succession under an artificial form, and vested by virtue of the law . . .  with capacity of acting 
in many respects as an individual") . 
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those of a separate entity. I 73 
Moderate commentators who tried to establish positions in the de­
bate between the extremes presented by Freund and Morawetz drew on 
the historical definitions as well. The definitions supported practical 
balancing of the entity and aggregate concepts through which some re­
ality could be ascribed to the entity without denial of the individual 
contribution. 1 74 
After the turn of the century, writers began to lose confidence in the 
Angell and Ames definition's effectiveness. The nineteenth century 
emphases on fiction and concession had disappeared, but no new con­
cepts came in to replace them and limit the definition's capacity. 
Rather than reformulate from the ground up on some new theoretical 
basis, writers supplemented the definition with a practical admonition. 
As one writer said: "A full and complete definition of a corporation can 
only be given by telling what are its rights, powers, duties, and rela­
tions, and the legal and equitable principles which control it in all its 
parts and functions and how they operate." 1 75 Hohfeld went farther in 
this direction. Parting company with the historical definitions, he de­
scribed the corporation as an association of natural persons conducting 
business under legal forms, methods, and procedures. 176 This charac­
terization dispensed with entity and aggregate theorizing and directed 
attention to doctrinal devices without looking further into them for 
meaning. These practical definitions, by referring inquiries to particu­
lars of corporate law, said in effect that the legal corporation is the sum 
of the laws, and that the received theoretical characterizations of the 
whole lack something in meaning. They thus anticipated Dewey's inde­
terminacy assertion of twenty to thirty years later. 
C. The Doctrinal Theory of the Corporate Firm After 1 9  3 0 
Theory of the firm had a bad reputation after the realist/anti-realist 
debate terminated in the late 1920s. Dewey's indeterminacy assertion 
became conventional wisdom.177 By 1976, traditional theory of the 
firm concepts had fallen so far from view that theoretically ambitious 
works on corporate structure omitted any mention of them.178 Discus-
1 73 .  V. MoRAWETZ, supra note 82 ,  at 1 -2 .  Morawetz's legal fiction is roughly the same 
concept as that of the new economic theorists .  See note 3 supra . 
1 74. 1 C. BEACH, supra note 82 ,  at 3-4; J .  CARTER, supra note 1 64 ,  at 34-38.  Kyd's defini­
tion, of course, did not support ascription of spiritual reality to the corporat ion.  
1 75 .  1 C.  SPELLING,  supra note 1 64 ,  at 4 ;  see also MAURICE CoNDIT CRoss, TYPES OF Bust­
NESS ENTERPRISE 53 ( 1 928) ;  R .  HARVEY, supra note 1 64 ,  at 7-8; 1 L. TOMPKINS ,  supra note 1 64 ,  
at 6 .  
1 76 .  WESLEY NEwcoMB HoHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS 1 98 (W.  Cook ed. 
1 923) ;  C. ELLIOTT, supra note 1 64 ,  at 2. 
1 77. See text accompanying notes 9 1 -93 supra . 
1 78 .  M .  EISENBERG, supra note 1 32 ,  at I (The "general principles underpinning.the legal 
s tructure of the corporation have not been well articulated.") . 
One contemporary anti-managerialist writer advocates returning to an entity conception 
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sion shifted to policy inquiries into management performance. Bayless 
Manning characterized the situation with a flourish in 1 962:  Commer­
cial images of the corporation had overshadowed the concept of the 
corporation; corporate law's underlying intellectual construct had rot­
ted away.179 Manning correctly identified the dominance of "commer­
cial images" of the corporation even as he overstated the latter point. 
Treatise writers after Dewey, freed from transcendental "corporate 
realism," practiced the very different lessons of "legal realism." They 
deprecated historical theory of the firm concepts as outmoded "con­
ceptual approaches" to policy problems. l 80 They avoided the whole 
bundle of past concepts. They even denied the relevance of an entity 
concept, 181 debunking it as metaphor, a device for ease of reference. 182 
These writers employed various substitute concepts, all of which 
had an antecedent in Hohfeld. One concept described the corporation 
as "more nearly a method than a thing" 183-a "technique" for organiz­
ing relationships among individuals.184 This approach stripped the 
fixed content from the entity concept, causing the entity to devolve into 
a rope tying together the bundle of relationships. Under this approach, 
each corporate relationship, whether a contract, or performance of a 
duty stemming from positive law, was analyzed separately according to 
its own circumstances. The corporation emerged with a variable 
meamng. 
A second substitute was Wormser's "legal unit."185 Here again, the 
corporation was described as a device-the means to the end of distin­
guishing corporate rights and liabilities from those of associated indi­
viduals. A third substitute was the "group interest." Here the 
corporation appeared as a "body of [individual] bodies" in which group 
and individual interests were to be distinguished.186 This conception 
replaced the "entity" with the "group." One writer claimed that this 
replacement caused all the conceptual difficulties presented by the cor­
poration's nonphysical qualities to disappear.187 
Governance-A .Hoving Target, 79 MICH. L. REv. 478, 487 ( 1 98 1 ) .  Knauss's point rests on a 
correct doctrinal assumption: Entity views and duties of care and loyalty go together. But in a 
climate in which the entity concept is suspect one does better to go beneath i t .  Instead of 
exal ting the bald reification, one should assert that  the care and loyalty duties spring from the 
constituting parts of the relations that give rise to the entity concept. See Bratton, supra note 
1 7 , at 
1 79 .  Bayless Manning, The Shareholders ' Appraisal Remedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
LJ . 223,  245 ( 1 962) . 
1 80. A. CoNARD, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at 4 1 9-20. 
1 8 1 .  WALTER H.  ANDERSON, LIMITATIONS OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY 7 ( 1 93 1 ) ; HENRY 
WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 2 (rev. ed. 1 946) .  
1 82 .  H.  BALLANTINE, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 2 .  
1 83 .  W. ANDERSON, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 7 .  
1 84 .  David L. Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F .  L. REv.  1 1 ,  12 ( 1 980-8 1 ) .  
1 85 .  H.  BALLANTINE,  supra note 1 8 1 ,  a t  2-3 (but not attributing the concept to Wormser) . 
1 86 .  HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 88 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
1 87 .  R .  STEVENS, supra note 70, a t  5 1 .  
We find another approach in I GEORGE D .  HoRNSTEIN,  CoRPORATION LAw AND PRACTICE 
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Despite different terminology and modes of legal analysis, and de­
spite assertive repudiation of past conceptions, these "modern" refor­
mulations in the end only recreated the historical definitions' picture of 
the firm. Gone, of course, were corporate realism and fiction theory. 
But the historical definition never incorporated the former, and it 
dropped the latter prior to the turn of the century. Consciousness of 
the concept's indeterminacy may have been new, but the historical defi­
nitions had effectively recognized the inevitability of indeterminacy all 
along. They built indeterminacy into the doctrine by providing for situ­
ational application of the entity and aggregate concepts. The twentieth 
century writers only repeated this basic lesson when they insisted that 
the corporation be treated as a person, unit, entity, or group, depend­
ing on the context. I SS 
The twentieth century writers' various characterizations of the firm 
entity-group interests, binding methods, and legal units-give us 
more or less the corporate entity envisioned by Kyd and respected in 
the treatises for a century.189 Even Chief Justice Marshall can be read 
back into the modern writers. When they pointed out that corporations 
are merely means to an end, 190 they only repeated one of the Chief 
Justice's points. Putting aside the concession notions peculiar to his 
time, ChiefJustice Marshall's legal fiction is difficult to distinguish from 
the legal unit of the Ballantine treatise.191 Both existed for the conduct 
of business; both were private; both were reified; and both gained 
meaning in the wider context of corporate doctrine. 
IV. CoMMENTs FROM THE HISTORY 
Drawing on the foregoing historical accounts, this part comments 
critically on the principal contemporary assertions about the legal the­
ory of the firm. 
Horwitz's proposition that corporate realism was a determinative 
force in legitimizing the management corporation is addressed first. 
Horwitz does not take into account the doctrinal theory of the firm em­
phasized in this article. The discussion suggests that once the perspec­
tive opens up to encompass the doctrinal theory and its constant 
quality, Horwitz's point must be modified substantially. 
Second, attention turns to the new economic theorists' assertion 
2 ( 1 959) . In Hornstein's practice-oriented view, what matters is not theory, but whether busi­
ness people use one form rather than another to achieve desired results . 
1 88. R .  STEVENS, supra note 70, at 95;  Ratner, supra note 1 84 ,  at 1 1 , 1 3  (recognizing that 
the Supreme Court had been flexible all along) . 
1 89 .  W. ANDERSON, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 7-8,  in fact, admits the existence of the corporate 
entity even as he formulates an alternative description of i t .  
1 90 .  H.  BALLANTINE, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 2 ;  NORMAN D.  LA1TIN ,  THE LAw OF CORPORA­
TIONS J -2 (2d ed. 1 97 1 ) .  
1 9 1 .  Ballantine described the corporation a s  a legal unit with separate legal existence, 
status and capacity, existing as a device for carrying on business. H.  BALLANTINE ,  supra note 
1 8 1 ,  at 2 .  
. ,, 
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that the corporation "is contract." The discussion suggests that this 
point is unsuited to literal transfer from the narrow context of eco­
nomic theory to the wider, more complex context of legal doctrine. 
A. Horwitz 's Proposition 
Horwitz is right in asserting that corporate realism and the manage­
ment corporation rose together. Corporate realism certainly offered a 
collectivist justification for the new mass producing entities. Moreover, 
it appeared just as these entities worked past the hostile implications of 
classical economic concepts to secure a safe place in the harbor of cor­
porate law. Implications of mutual assistance arise from such temporal 
confluences of theory and practice. 
But Horwitz's point that corporate realism caused the management 
corporation's success can be turned around-the practice could have 
aided the theory more than the theory aided the practice. A counter 
picture of practice determining theory finds support in the relation­
ships between economic changes at the turn of the century and the sev­
eral levels of the theory of the corporate firm-the constant doctrinal 
theory, the opposed schools of corporate realism and contractualism, 
and superseding managerialist theory. The counter picture is neither 
more nor less falsifiable than Horwitz's picture. 
First consider the relationship between the doctrinal theory of the 
firm and the development of the management corporation. The man­
agement corporation changed the landscape that the corporate trea­
tises described. The definitions reflected the change, albeit indirectly. 
The late nineteenth century writers omitted the legal fiction concept. 
This omission had a doctrinal cause-the appearance of general incor­
poration laws-but it also may be inferred that the management corpo­
ration made the theory untenable. The legal fiction notion instantiated 
the classical economic perspective. Given the management corpora­
tion, more in the way of social reality had to be conceded to the firm . 
The historical definitions made this concession by dropping the limit­
ing concept. 
Next consider the relationship between the doctrinal theory of the 
firm and the debate over corporate realism and contractualism. Here 
the treatise-writers made a significant move. As the concession and fic­
tion notions dropped out, the contractual and realist schools invited 
the doctrine in different directions. One offered contract and pure lib­
eral individualism; the other offered realism and European organicism. 
The doctrinalists refused both invitations, choosing instead, as their 
predecessors had done, to balance the metapolitical alternatives. The 
doctrinal theory only changed in appearance when the writers aban­
doned the historical vocabulary around 1 930 .  This change occurred 
just after corporate realism collapsed and at the same time that 
managerialism became the basis for discussion of the management cor-
1 5 1 2  S TANFORD LA W REVIE W [Vol. 4 1 : 1 4 7 1 
poration. Policy replaced doctrine as the mode of debate on corporate 
legitimacy, and the treatise-writers made conforming changes in their 
basic conceptions of the corporation. 
Thus, when the managerialist era arrived, neither corporate realism 
nor contractualism had achieved a sufficiently deep level of acceptance 
to become the generally accepted basis for everyday corporate doc­
trine. Realism and contractualism were events of primarily academic 
interest. When academic theory changed course around 1 930,  corpo­
rate realism disappeared with hardly a trace. 
The fragility of theory of the firm concepts permits the inference 
that practice had the primary causative role. The new management cor­
poration necessitated considerable adjustment to ways of thinking 
about economic life. 192 It took some time before a settled bundle of 
concepts achieved general currency. The corporate realism debates oc­
curred during the period of adjustment. Observers were generally 
favorable to the management corporation because of its apparent eco­
nomic success, but lacked present explanatory and legitimizing theo­
ries. This uncertainty made corporate realism plausible for a time, but 
the realist explanation proved tentative. As the management corpora­
tion matured, a more suitable set of concepts achieved general cur­
rency. As a result, corporate realism fell out of currency rather 
abruptly. 
The supplanting and enduring ideas came from contemporary 
American economics rather than from nineteenth century European ju­
risprudence. These ideas were practical: Management possessed ex­
pertise and performed its job effectively; therefore, it had the law's 
support. 1 93 To the extent management's performance failed to fit 
whatever scheme of social, political, or economic guidelines the partic­
ular observer applied, then some economic or legal adjustment was re­
quired. 1 94 As this practical picture of the management corporation was 
drawn, and pro- and anti-managerial positions staked out within its 
framework, corporate realism's basis in European speculation about 
group imperatives must have come to seem out of touch with practice. 
Ever-present American individualism provides a deeper explanation 
for the change. Americans historically tend to be uncomfortable with 
theories-here termed "organicist"-that accord the group intrinsic 
primacy over the individual.195 Corporate realism was organicist; 
managerialism was not, even though it tended to socialize individual 
1 92 .  See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra . 
1 93 .  See notes 1 1 6- 1 2 1  supra and accompanying text. 
1 94 .  See notes 1 3 1 - 1 34 supra and accompanying text. 
1 95 .  See Roberta Romano, .\letapohtics and Cmporate Law Refonn, 36 STAN. L. REv. 923,  
929-30, 934 ( 1 984) ;  see also Bratton, supra note 1 7 , at . Organicist rhetoric never disappears 
entirely, however. For a recent example, see Oliver E-:
-
Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organ­
ization, 4 J .L. EcoN. & ORe. 65, 86 ( 1 988) (describing the contemporary corporate restructur­
ing movement as organizational "mitosis," a "quasi-biological" process ) .  
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interests. Managerialism internalized individualism by conditioning its 
legitimization of collective corporate life on management performance. 
It acknowledged a significant, if not dominant, place for contract in the 
structure of the management corporation. 1 96 And it offered a firm con­
ception consonant with the political alignment sought by both sides of 
the debate: With managerialism, individualists could be pro-manageri­
alist at the same time that collectivists could be anti-managerialist. 
B. The New Economic Theory of the Firm 
The new economic theory presented something new to the world of 
neoclassical microeconomics when its neoclassical variant appeared in 
the 1970s. Its nexus of contracts assertion solved a century-old prob­
lem by offering a way around the conceptual barriers to a neoclassical 
theory of corporate structure. But transposed to a legal context, the 
assertion was less new than it looked. Contract always has figured into 
the legal theory of the firm. The new economic theory confirms and 
repeats legal history when it asserts that the corporation "is contract." 
It joins a tradition when it offers to resolve the tension between the 
ideals of classical economics and the institution of the management cor­
poration. But the new theory also breaks with the historical pattern: It 
is absolutely contractual, while contract never has dominated legal 
theory. 
This absolute contractualism makes problematic the new theory's 
practical application in the law. The new theory faces the same di­
lemma as much contemporary academic legal theory. It was received 
successfully into legal discourse because of its connection to the values 
that historically have informed corporate law. But this enhancement of 
historical values continues only so long as the discourse stays on a theo­
retical level. If the new economic theory were to achieve practical ac­
ceptance and become the basis of corporate doctrine, it would 
reconstruct the earlier values. Thus, the basis for its original accept­
ance would dissolve in the wake of its complete success. 
To see the connection between historical values and the new eco­
nomic theory's reception in the legal academy, one must take a broad 
view of the contemporary theoretical landscape. Two steps must be 
taken for this large picture to come into focus. First, juxtapose the two 
variants of the new economic theory with the managerialist picture of 
hierarchical structure. Second, consider the entire theoretical land­
scape: Managerialist, institutionalist, and neoclassical conceptions co­
exist in contemporary corporate discourse. Taken together, these 
conceptions resemble the juxtaposition of conceptions in Angell and 
Ames. Like the Angell and Ames pictures, these pictures variously em­
phasize the entity and the aggregate, the sovereign and the contractual. 
Like Angell and Ames's pictures, all of these view the corporation as a 
1 96 .  See text accompanying note 1 98 infra.  
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reification, differing in the conceptions placed inside it. The broad 
view, then, shows a level at which the historical doctrinal theory contin­
ues to operate. 
Significantly, modern academic theory reflected the doctrinal theory 
less clearly before the new economic theory appeared. The manageri­
alist picture understated the presence of contract, particularly arms­
length contract, in corporate arrangements. For decades, anti­
managerialist commentators criticized corporate doctrine for insuffi­
cient recognition of fiduciary constraints. Not all observers shared this 
anti-managerialism, but supporters of managerial discretion had no 
well-articulated theoretical response. The new economic theory's con­
tractualism gave them an answer, explaining and justifying the doc­
trine's pro-management recalcitrance. It thereby brought academic 
theory back into alignment with the doctrinal theory and its enduring 
base point of individualism. 
The new theory also resonated well because it drew on elements 
already present in and around corporate doctrine. Twentieth century 
corporations and corporate doctrine offered plenty of contracts around 
which to base a theory. The case law alternated between an entity­
based structural conception in which the entity employs management, 
and a contractually based structural conception, in which management 
acts as the shareholders' agent. 1 97 The Berlian theoretical picture of 
the corporation featured contract prominently: 1 98 Managers, laborers, 
suppliers, creditors, and customers contracted into corporate relation­
ships; corporate investors traded stocks and bonds by means of discrete 
contracts. No generally accepted doctrinal barrier had forced the theo­
retical subordination of contract, at least in the twentieth century. In 
addition, American jurisprudence had the individualist spirit requisite 
for a contractual theory. 
Thus, the new theory articulated points and values already embed­
ded in the doctrine but only faintly recognized in earlier academic the­
ory. But the new theory broke sharply with another, equally significant 
strand of historical precedent: the relegation of contract to a support­
ing role in corporate legal theory and practice. Absolutely asserted 
contractual theories had appeared before-one during the late nine­
teenth century and a second with Coase's essay of 1 93 7 .  Nineteenth 
century contract theory failed to garner general acceptance, and 
Coase's 1 937 discussion of the firm as a product of cost-effective con­
tracting had limited influence, even among economists, for more than 
thirty years. 
The new economic theory descends directly from Coase. It has a 
1 97 .  The entity conception is employed , for example, in A. BERLE & G .  M EANS, supra 
note 60, at 220-23;  R .  STEVENS, supra note 70, at 69 1 -92 .  For an example of the interplay 
between entity and contractual approaches, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 1 32 ,  at  85-94 . 
1 98 .  Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 5 1 ,  pointed this out recently. See notes I 04- 1 08 
supra and accompanying text. 
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more collateral relation with the contractualism of nineteenth century 
legal theory, but a cognizable tie binds the two. Fixing the new the­
ory's relations with earlier corporate theory, and explaining the earlier 
theory's failure to achieve general acceptance, demonstrates limitations 
on the new theory's potential practical influence. 
The new economic theory's tie to nineteenth century contractualism 
arises from their common ancestry in the classical economic tradition. 
The theories bear significant familial resemblances: Both strip the en­
tity reification of nearly all content; both use the phrase "legal fiction" 
to describe the entity; 1 99 both view the relations of managers and cor­
porations in terms of the problems of self-interested agents;200 and 
both utilize the contract idea to forestall governmental restraint of the 
corporation. 201 
Despite these similarities, the two approaches have materially differ­
ent goals. The nineteenth century contractualists sought to protect a 
disaggregated economic system from the constraints of corporate hier­
archies. The new economic theory abandons their goal even as it re­
vives their concepts. The new theory accepts the management 
corporation and employs classical economic ideas-ideas originally de­
rived from observation of a disaggregated economy-to justify its con­
tinuing presence. 
This is a significant turn in the history of relations between corpo­
rate enterprise and American individualism. Before the turn of the cen­
tury, individualists held to an atomistic social ideal and attacked all big 
organizations, public and private. Next came an uneasy coexistence, 
manifested in the neoclassicists' limited consideration of the firm. Fi­
nally, with the new economic theory, the heirs of the classical tradition 
surrender to the corporate hierarchy and embrace it. In so doing, the 
new theorists announce that corporate hierarchies had been composed 
of bilateral market contracts all along. But theirs is a different, more 
rearguard political action than that of their nineteenth century prede­
cessors. Today's contractualists limit their critique to the largest hier­
archical institution, the government. To bolster opposition, they 
legitimize nongovernmental institutions with a diluted version of the 
atomistic social ideai.202 
1 99 .  See text accompanying note 4 supra . 
200. See J .  HuRST, supra note 54, at 45-49 (the nineteenth century cri tique) . 
20 I .  This was the move made by the Santa Clara l i t igants. See text accompanying note 84 
supra . 
202 . Anti-individualist perspectives have gone through twists of their own during this 
century in their application to corporations. At the turn of the century, the theorists concen­
trating on group existence were the realists, and their work favored management .  In today's 
corporate law discussions, anti-managerialists take entities most seriously. See text accompa­
nying notes 1 29- 1 35 supra . Actually ,  the point is more complex. Early twentieth century 
Progressives also took group existence seriously, and they opposed the corporate realis ts .  See 
Horwitz, supra note 1 4 ,  at 223-24.  Post-war institutional economists take corporate entit ies 
very seriously on management's behalf. See notes 1 1 4 - 1 1 8 supra and accompanying text .  The 
--� -'· 
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To explain contract's long absence from academic theories of the 
corporate firm, we look to the appearance of power relationships in 
practice. Before the 1970s, legal academics and institutional econo­
mists emphasized hierarchies, while neoclassical economists turned a 
blind eye to the firm's interior, because contract, and particularly the 
discrete contract of academic contract law of this century's early de­
cades,203 did not seem to capture the institution's essence. The con­
tracting process had a quiet dynamic; it did not appear actively to 
govern. Management seemed to be the catalyst that made the factors 
of production work successfully in the management corporation, and 
this catalytic capability stemmed from structural position. Management 
appeared to possess unilateral power-it directed production. The ob­
vious complex of bilateral contracts in and around the firm failed to 
comprise the center of gravity in the theory because they did not seem 
to affect the distribution of power in practice. 
Had actors in the capital markets chosen to exercise a governance 
role, as they did during the middle period of the nineteenth century, 
the complex of contracts respecting stocks and bonds might have 
prompted formulation of a different, more contractual theory of the 
firm. Instead, a contractual event in practice-the implicit agreement 
between management and the financial community-kept investors and 
their stock and bond sales contracts from figuring actively in the power 
picture. Given this background, the anti-managerialists quite sensibly 
looked to public sources-the force of public opinion204 or legal re­
form205-for controls on management discretion. 
Recent practical changes, subsumed under the heading "market for 
corporate control," have changed the corporate power picture. Stock­
holders and their contracts have taken a prominent place.206 But the 
changes have not been sufficiently revolutionary to create a practice 
that mirrors the absolute contractualism held out by the new economic 
theory. 
Anything being possible, the new theory's absolutist contractualism 
could find its way into corporate doctrine and effect a break with the 
historical pattern. But given past experience, such a fundamental 
change seems unlikely. In the past, theories that would close off the 
capacity of corporate law to facilitate transactions or their regulation 
have not made the transfer from commentary into doctrine. Single­
minded adherence to the new economic theory is as out of touch with 
insti tutionalist new theorists also take group existence seriously, even though they privilege 
the individual participant's role. 
203. This is the formal, objectified contract law of Williston and the first RESTATEMENT 
OF CONTRACTS ( 1 932) .  
204 . A .  BERLE, Jupra note 20, at 54 . 
205.  See Cary, Jupra note 26; R .  NADER, M. GREEN & J .  SELIGMAN, Jupra note 20 ,  at 62-65, 
suggesting federal intervention. 
206. These changes are discussed in detail at notes 208-2 14  infra and accompanying 
text. 
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the values historically undergirding corporate law as some of the sin­
gleminded anti-managerialism of the 1970s was in its time. 
To sum up, the doctrinal theory of the corporate firm refutes the 
assertion that the corporation "is contract." History tells us that the 
corporation "is contract, and always has been contract and other things 
besides." While the doctrinal theory always takes cognizance of con­
tractual elements, it never makes contract the essence. The doctrinal 
theory balances contract against the corporate entity and a sovereign 
presence. If, as seems probable, corporate law continues to evolve in 
accordance with the historical pattern, decisionmaking will proceed 
with reference to the particulars of the corporate relationship in ques­
tion. Selection of the applicable theoretical paradigm-managerialist 
or contractual-will occur in the particular context as a quasi-political 
decision. Contractual notions will be entertained, but any move to 
foreclose wider discussion by the assertion that contract should govern 
as a function of the intrinsic nature of the corporation will fail. 
V. CoNTEMPORARY HisTORY-THE MARKET FOR CoRPORATE 
CONTRO L, THE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, AND THE NEW 
EcoNOMIC THEORY 
The preceding discussion focused on recent changes in the theories 
describing power relationships in management corporations. Practical 
changes in these power relationships also have occurred recently. After 
1960, corporate control became a more and more aggressively traded 
commodity. After 1980, trading became so extensive that it precipi­
tated a widespread restructuring of management corporations.207 
A substantial body of commentary connects these practical develop­
ments to the new economic theory. The commentators look to the new 
:heory to explain the practice, and to the practice to prove or disprove 
:he new theory's assertions. These connections tend to be ahistorical. 
The following discussion connects the theory and the practice on a 
:lifferent level. It considers the practice, in history, as an explanation 
'or the existence of the theory, and the theory, in history, as an expla­
lation for changes in the practice. 
\. The Early Nfarket for Corporate Control and the Appearance of the New 
Economic Theory 
As discussed in part IV, practical appearances of hierarchical power 
�ept contract in a supporting role in corporate theory during most of 
his century. The market for corporate control has changed the practi­
:al picture materially. The hostile takeover makes it possible to remove 
:orporate superiors by the exercise ·of stock market purchasing power. 
�s takeovers have proliferated, changes have followed in the structure 
207 . See notes 2 1 5-22 1 infra and accompanying text. 
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and internal affairs of management hierarchies. In effect, discrete con­
tracts among stockholders take a significant place in the governance of 
the management corporation for the first time. The new economic the­
ory parallels this practical change: It brings discrete contracting to a 
significant theoretical place in the governance of the management cor­
poration for the first time. The histories of the theory and the practice 
invite interrelation. 
Here is the proposition: The appearance of this aggressive mode of 
discrete contracting was necessary to make a contractual picture of the 
management corporation plausible. Although the new economic the­
ory, particularly its neoclassical variant, tends to be stated ahistorically, 
its success, and possibly its very existence, meaningfully can be ac­
counted for historically. Had the practical changes not occurred, the 
new theory probably never would have appeared, and it certainly would 
not have achieved general currency in the legal academy. 208 
The chronology of the market for corporate control supports the 
proposition. Tender offers have a long history as a corporate tool, but 
prior to the 1950s they were used internally as a mode of stock repur­
chase. The earliest hostile uses of the tender offer came in the 1950s, 
and this usage matured in the 1960s. The first intensive year was 1963, 
in which twenty-three hostile tender offers were made; eighty-six 
tender offers were made in 1967. Most of these early hostile tender 
offers were successful.2°9 Neoclassical observers saw the tie to their 
methodology right away. Henry Manne made the first theoretical asser­
tion that the takeover phenomenon constituted market control of man­
agement conduct in an article published in 1965.210 He introduced the 
phrase "market for corporate control" and asserted that the market ac­
corded shareholders practical power commensurate with their interests 
in the corporation. 
Manne's neoclassical interpretation was not the only plausible view 
of the takeover phenomenon during the early period. Indeed, prior to 
1980, Manne's probably was not the most widely accepted view. The 
early takeovers also fit into the institutional economists' picture. In 
their view, the takeover enhanced managerial power. The paradigm 
208. One caveat should be entered here. While practice in this context facilitated the 
emergence of new theory by raising practical questions about the accuracy of the received 
managerialist picture, the theorists did not necessarily make primary reference to the practice. 
The neoclassical variant of the new economic theory draws heavily on neoclassical 
microeconomic assumptions.  The classical market ideal from which these assumptions are 
drawn has been largely superseded in history. The theory's adherence to these assumptions 
attenuates its connection to practice. 
209. Douglas V. Austin, Tender Offers Revisited: 1 968- 1 9 72 Comparisons with the Past and 
Future Trends, 8 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1 973 ,  at 1 6. The number of tender offers 
declined in the early 1 970s and then picked up again in the middle of that decade.  Douglas V .  
Austin, Tender Offer Statistics: .Vew Strategies Are Paying Of . 10  MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS , Fall 
1 975 ,  at 9, 1 0- 1 1 .  
2 1 0 .  Henry G .  Manne, Mvgers and the .Harket for Corporate Control, 73 J .  PoL. EcoN . 1 1 0 ,  
1 1 3 ( 1 965) .  
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hostile takeover during the 1960s and 1970s was an aggressive act by 
the managers of a large corporation against the managers of a smaller 
corporation. This paradigm takeover was one of several means em­
ployed in building conglomerate corporations. Such takeovers served 
the managerialist growth objective. Although the managers of the los­
ing target corporation lost their jobs, their removal came at the initia­
tive of a more powerful, similarly situated group. Management's image 
of structural empowerment therefore remained in place even as some 
insecurity of tenure came into the picture. 211 
Williamson, writing in accord with this perspective, explained the 
appearance of takeovers after 1960 as a product of the spread of the 
multidivisional corporate structure. This new structure redirected 
management attention from running production lines to the collection 
of conglomerate portfolios of operating units. Takeovers then arose to 
facilitate portfolio construction. 212 
During the early takeover period, lawyers and legal academics, like 
most economists, continued to operate under the managerialist picture. 
Anti-managerialists viewed management growth by acquisition with 
suspicion. Most of this suspicion manifested itself in antitrust objec­
tions, but corporate law reasons for caution also existed. Anti­
managerialists sought application of fiduciary duty concepts to restrain 
the conduct of management in defending against tender offers, and to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders after takeover.213 Fur­
thermore, hostile takeovers tended to depress the price of the stock of 
the successful offeror, showing a market judgment that the takeovers 
aggrandized the managers of offeror corporations, and enriched target 
shareholders at the expense of the offeror's shareholders.214 
2 1 1 .  The takeover " threat" also was considered a market mechanism for discipline of 
management conduct. I t  accordingly provided a response to the anti-managerialists' legiti­
macy point. See M .  AoKI, supra note 1 1 0 ,  at 36-40. 
2 1 2 .  Focusing on multidivisional structure reconstituted the firm as a governance s truc­
ture rather than a production function. Williamson, supra note 49, at  362; see also Williamson, 
The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, and Attributes, supra note 42. 
2 1 3 . Heavily cri ticized decisions permitting defensive tactics include: Panter v .  Marshall 
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 2 7 1  (7th Cir. 1 98 1 ) ;  Moran v .  Household Int ' l ,  Inc., 500 A.2d 1 346 
(Del. 1 985) ;  Cheff v .  Mathes, 4 1  Del. Ch.  494 , 1 99 A.2d 548 ( 1 964) .  Recently, the courts have 
begun to scrutinize more closely management decisions regarding the control market. See 
Revlon, Inc. v .  MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc . ,  506 A.2d 1 73 (Del. 1 986) ; Hanson 
Trust PLC v .  ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. , 78 1 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1 986) . 
In cases concerning the treatment of minority shareholder interests remaining in the ac­
quired corporation after a takeover, the Delaware courts have made some famous anti-mana­
gerial rulings. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. ,  457 A.2d 70 1 (Del .  1 983) ; Singer v. Magnavox 
Co . ,  380 A.2d 969 (Del .  1 977) .  
2 1 4 .  Herman, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 537 ;  Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of.\1erger Activ­
ity and the Objective Functions of ,V/erging Firms, I I  J. FIN. EcoN. 1 55 ,  1 7 7  ( 1 983) . Contra Michael 
C .  Jensen & Richard S .  Ruback, The .\Iarket for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 1 1  J. FIN .  
ECON. 5 ,  I I , 1 6  ( 1 983) .  
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B. The Contemporary 1\1arket for Corporate Control and the New Economic 
Theory 
The new economic theory does not unequivocally support manage­
ment interests. The theory's denial of hierarchy strengthens manage­
ment's position, but only as long as it does not support any serious 
challenges to that position. During the 1980s, the market for corporate 
control created such challenges. Just as the new economic theory's 
contractualism supports management against statist challenges from 
the corporate governance movement, its contractualism also supports 
corporate control transactions against management objections.2 1 5  
In the more aggressive market for corporate control that appeared 
after 1980, almost all corporations became potential subjects for attack. 
Trading extended to corporate reconstruction as well as corporate con­
trol. Even middle management began to suffer. In this new cast, the 
takeover challenged not only management's security of position, but 
also its discretionary power. 
New actors and financing devices carried the market to this more 
aggressive posture. Independent financial entrepreneurs entered the 
market as hostile offerors.216 The new entrepreneurs played a different 
game. Unlike the conglomerate-building managers of the earlier pe­
riod, they did not use the devices of the corporate control market to 
enhance operational power positions. They simply sought to force 
large payments to equity holders. 
Funds for the big premiums came through aggressive use of the old­
est financing tool, debt. The target's assets supplied the borrowing 
base. Once target-based debt financing became a critical component in 
a tender offer's success, a structural position atop a corporate hierarchy 
ceased to be a prerequisite for participation in the market. An actor 
taking an aggressive posture needed only credibility in the capital 
markets. 
"Bust up" takeovers commenced in 1984. These opened up a sec­
ond source of finance-sale of the target company's assets. Big pay­
ments to equity holders came from the proceeds of a subsequent 
dismantling of the target corporation as well as from borrowing. With 
these takeovers, actors on the corporate control market began to 
deconstruct the conglomerate corporations that the early control mar-
2 1 5. The theory's agency cost line comes to bear against management here. The tender 
offer is conceived as a traditional form of market control. I t  encourages devotion to the prin­
cipal's interest in the agent .  This idea can be traced to Manne, supra note 2 1 0 ,  at 1 1 2- 1 4 ,  and 
i t  reappears frequently in the contemporary literature on takeovers. See, e.g. , Lucian A. 
Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitatzng Competing Tender Offm, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1 028 ,  1 030-3 1 
( 1 982 ) ;  Frank H .  Easterbrook & Daniel R .  Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target s .\Ianagement in 
Respondzng to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1 1 6 1 ,  1 1 69-74 ( 1 98 1 ) ; Ronald J. Gilson, .4. Struc­
tural Approach to Cmporations: The Case Against Defenszve Tactics 111 Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 
8 1 9, 84 1 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
2 1 6 .  John C .  Coffee, Jr . ,  Shareholders Versus .\/anagers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 8 5  
MICH. L .  REV . I ,  2-3 ( 1 986) . 
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ket helped construct. Reconstruction also was pursued defensively, 
through leveraged buyouts and stock repurchases. These defensive 
payouts to equity holders utilized the same financing tools of borrow­
ing and asset sales.2 I 7  
Although the full implications of this corporate restructuring re­
main unclear, a few generalizations can be made. The restructurings 
materially alter the old managerialist picture of structural empower­
ment. First, their quantity, scope, and frequency has made manage­
ment tenure generally insecure. Second, the longstanding implicit 
agreement between management and capital has dissolved. The invest­
ment community no longer passively accepts the growth objective. 
Thus, restructurings may be viewed as the capital markets' successful 
demand for the return of capital suboptimally invested in pursuit of 
growth.218 By forcing the return of this capital, the investment commu­
nity indirectly, but strongly, influences the shaping of investment pol­
icy. Because investment policy is the central discretionary function of 
the multidivisional corporate management group, capital's refusal to 
comply and cooperate denudes management of significant power. 
For the first time since the brief appearance of finance capitalism in 
the nineteenth century,219 then, actors in the capital markets critically 
influence investment policy. Capital's perspective still tends toward the 
short term. As a result, conflicts between the short- and long-term in­
vestment perspectives of investors and managers have become a prob­
lem once again.220 Legal policy discussions have adjusted in response. 
Emphasis has shifted from management's abuse of power acquired by 
structural default, to management's inability to invest with a long view 
because of capital's power to terminate management at will.22 1 
The restructurings also require conforming adjustments in the ex­
isting body of work under the new economic theory. The institutional­
ists explained the conglomerate corporation as a product of a 
contracting process driven by the competitive need to decrease 
costs.222 The restructurings undo conglomerate combinations, elimi­
nating layers of multidivisional form diversification and firing layers of 
management staff.223 In effect, the financial community repudiates the 
2 1 7 . Of the 850 largest American corporations, 398 undertook voluntary res tructurings 
between the beginning of 1 984 and the middle of 1 985.  !d. at 7 .  
2 1 8 .  That is ,  the capital was invested in the corporation for a return at a rate less  than its 
cost. There is statistical evidence that excess ive earnings retention, a practice detrimental to 
shareholders, was common. See id. at 22 & n .59. 
2 1 9 .  See text accompanying note 69 supra . 
220. See generally LoUis LowENSTEIN, WHAT's WRONG WITH WALL STREET ( 1 988) . 
22 1 .  The contemporary discussions are well summarized in several articles in a BusiNESS 
WEEK special report entitled Deal .\!ania . See Norman Jonas & joan Berger, Do all these Deals 
Help 01 Hurl the [ ·. S. Economy, Bus. WK. ,  Nov. 24, 1 986, at 86-88; Judith H .  Dobrzynski, .\lore 
than Ever, II :S .\fanagemenl for the Short Term , Bus. W K . Nov. 24 , 1 986, at 92-93. 
222. See notes 99- 1 00 supra and accompanying text. 
223. This is Coffee's critique of Williamson. See Coffee, supra note 2 1 6, at 3 1 -35 .  Wil­
l iamson has responded by updating his his torical account of the evolution of corporate organ-
, ., ,.._ ___ _ 
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proposition that conglomerates are cost effective. 
The neoclassical model224 also must be adjusted.225 The model as­
sumed that contracting actors adopted structures capable of bringing 
agency costs down to a competitive minimum. It then explained ex­
isting arrangements, including the relative passivity of the capital mar­
kets and the dominance of management, in those terms. When 
historical forces suddenly and materially rewrote the contracts, doubts 
arose about the validity of this ahistorical picture, and of the methodol­
ogy that created it. The restructurings manifest the capital markets' 
judgment that previous market arrangements did not effectively mini­
mize management agency costs. In response, Jensen has modified his 
picture of the firm to explain the massive replacement of equity by debt 
in terms of an efficient contracting device: Management borrows at a 
high fixed rate to "bond" its future performance.226 But, as Coffee has 
pointed out, this prospective and ahistorical adjustment does not erase 
the model's previous failure to accommodate history.227 
Despite these difficulties with particulars, the new economic theory 
may be connected with the appearance of the market for corporate re­
construction. To see the connection one must take a broad view. The 
new theory's contractual perspective assumes that people look closely 
and act firmly when money is at stake. It depicts a corporate structure 
in which rational investors work hard to circumvent managerial claims 
to nonreviewability due to differential expertise. 228 This approach con­
signs management to a reduced status. 
ization. He accounts for restructuring as an outgrowth of the spread of the modern 
conglomerate structure. Because the benefits from an acquisition may not continue indefi­
nitely, the M-form entity undergoes "mitosis"-a "quasi-biological" process likened to cell 
division in which the firm divests acquired activities, often in multidivisional units which are 
themselves M-form firms. Williamson, supra note 1 95 ,  at 86-87. 
224. See text accompanying notes 28-40 supra . 
225 .  This discussion draws extensively on Coffee, supra note 2 1 6, at 25-28 .  
226. Michael C.  Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76  
AM.  EcoN. REv. 323 ,  324-26 (May 1 986) (papers & proceedings ) .  
227 .  Coffee, supra note 2 1 6 ,  at 28 .  
228.  Levmore, supra note 22 ,  at 70-72 .  Levmore, working within the  paradigm, antici­
pated the interaning elements of later restructurings. He noted that shareholder and man­
agement interests diverge when the shareholder interest calls for dissolution of the 
corporation. He applied an institutionalist explanation: Management had made a firm-spe­
cific investment; a shutdown would be contrary to its interest in recouping that investment. 
!d. at 7 1 .  
Levmore also noted a pertinent problem with the Jensen and Meckling model o f  the firm. 
In  their model, management, by increasing its own stake in the enterprise, decreased its in­
centive to misbehave and the investors' need to monitor, thereby reducing agency costs. 
Drawing on finance theory, Levmore noted that management's investment interests also in­
clude a diversified portfolio, and that this interest would prevent it from making such an ex­
tensive investment in its own firm. !d. at  67.  
Coffee has expanded on these points in an explanation of the bust-up takeover. Coffee 
sees management through the lens of finance theory and contends that management 's inevita­
bly outsized investment in its own firm makes rational diversification of its portfolio impossi­
ble. Management therefore is more risk averse than are investors in the financial community 
who can and do fully diversify their investment portfolios. As a result ,  management makes 
safe investments which are suboptimal from the point of view of investors. The current wave 
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The neoclassical picture contains additional, strong negative impli­
cations for management. The theory's minimal firm entity removes 
management from its former position as the essence of the firm. Man­
agement emerges in the picture as but one of many factors of produc­
tion.229 In the neoclassical world of discrete contracts, factors of 
production come and go as contracts continually are made, performed, 
and remade, or are made and broken. No relational values afford man­
agement a defense against attack by investors seeking to rewrite the 
next generation of contracts. No entity notions, no notion of profes­
sionalism, and no sense of the necessity of tenure protection enter into 
the picture. 
Even the institutional variant implicitly recognizes managerial vul­
nerability. Its description of multidivisional structure demystifies the 
management process. Hands-on production skills no longer figure into 
management's strategic position. The multidivisional architect of a 
portfolio of operating divisions has no skills not possessed in rudimen­
tary form by the latest crop of business school graduates. Like the neo­
classicists' factors of production, the institutionalists' portfolio manager 
is replaceable in the active search for a higher return.230 
Thus, the market practice of corporate restructuring generated by 
contract-sales of stock on or off the trading markets, and arms-length 
debt contracts231-demonstrates the theory's dynamic, if not every 
point of the extant models. The market practice follows the theory in 
time: In the 1970s, the theory asserted that the managerialist picture of 
unilateral power was inaccurate; in the 1980s, the marketplace changed 
the picture and used the theory's primary tool, the discrete, bilateral 
contract, as the means of shifting power. Today's popular conception 
of the powerful business figure is not the managerialist chief executive 
officer but the capitalist deal maker-the financial entrepreneur or the 
investment banker.232 Characterized in the vocabulary of the new eco-
of corporate restructurings are an assertion by the investment community of the primacy of its 
own investment objectives. See Coffee, supra note 2 1 6, at  1 5-2 1 .  
229. See Eugene F .  Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn, 8 8  J .  PoL EcoN. 288 ,  
290 ( 1 980) (describing management as  a " type of labor but  wi th a special role-coordinating 
the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed [upon) among [the) inputs") . 
230. Viewed retrospectively, management's invocation of the authority of the new eco­
nomic theorists in the corporate governance debates of the early 1 980s was precipitous. See 
notes 142 - 143  supra and accompanying text. The notions of entity and sovereign participa­
tion undergirding the anti-managerialist arguments contain much more defensive potential 
than does the new theory's contractualism. A comparison of the Delaware cases on tender 
offer defense tactics dramatically illustrates this point. The successful case incorporates pro­
tection of the entity. See Cheff v. Mathes, 4 1  Del. Ch. 494, 1 99 A.2d 548 ( 1 964 ) .  The manage­
ment group that abandons an entity conception and reconstitutes its responses with 
contractual values weakens its case. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,  506 
A.2d 1 73 ( Del. 1 986) . 
23 1 .  For a review of changes in debt contracting patterns ,  see Morey W. McDaniel, Bond­
holders and Corporate Governance, 4 1  Bus. LAw. 4 1 3  ( 1 986) . 
232 .  See Anthony Bianco, America Has a New Kingpin: the Investment Banker, Bus. WK. ,  Nov. 
24, 1 986, at 77. The character Gordon Gekko in the film Wall Street manifests the conception. 
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nomic theory, these figures acquire power as transaction cost engi­
neers. They conceive and Imtlate transactions, depriving the 
managerial beneficiaries of the more costly existing contracts of power 
and wealth. 
Can we ascribe to the antecedent theory a causative role in the sub­
sequent practice? Paraphrasing Horwitz's conclusions on the turn-of­
the-century interplay between theory of the firm and corporate prac­
tice, the causation assertion would be that the rise of the new economic 
theory was a "major factor" in legitimizing the market restructuring of 
the management corporation and that "none of the theoretical alterna­
tives could provide as much sustenance"233 to the new anti-manage­
ment utilization of the market for corporate control. 
This causation assertion overstates the theory's role. Conceptual 
associations between the theory and the practice are easy to make; ar­
ticulating a precise causative role for the theory in recent movements of 
billions of dollars of capital is more difficult. Models in the journal of 
Financial Economics do not become business plans for the new financial 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, practice offers alternative, plausible deter­
minative antecedents. Two decades of managerialist use of the take­
over account for the presence of the devices used. The contemporary 
structure of the institutional investment community accounts for the 
disappearance of the Wall Street rule and for more aggressive share­
holder postures. The competitive failures of American management in 
international markets during the last two decades,234 and the disap­
pointing returns on common stock during the decade prior to 1 984, 
account for a general consensus on the need to restructure. 
Even so, the new economic theory has a place in all this. The re­
structuring takeover has met little effective opposition,235 and any 
number of legislative moves might have deterred it.236 The theory per­
suasively manifests the wider antiregulatory and contractualist environ-
233 .  Horwitz, supra note 14 ,  at 1 76 .  
234. See generally M .  PIORE & C. SABEL, supra note 74,  at 1 84-202. 
235. For criticism of congressional inaction, see L. LowENSTEIN, supra note 220, at ! 56-
58,  1 68-76. Talk of congressional in tervention persists ,  fueled by the stock market crash of 
October 1 987,  and the great food company restructurings of the fal l  of 1 988. In tervention 
itself s till seems unlikely. See Gregory Robb, Rude1· Sees .\'o Crisis in Buyouts, N.Y. Times, Dec.  
23 ,  1 988, at  D I ,  col . 3 ;  see generally William W .  Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory 
in a Time of Restructunng, 1 989 DuKE L.J 92. 
The exception to the rule of nonintervention is the proliferation of state takeover s tat­
utes. These have gone through several generations of form and have been the subject of two 
Supreme Court opinions. Edgar v .  Mite Corp . ,  457 U .S .  624 ( 1 982)  (statute requiring disclo­
sure by offeror beyond that required by federal law unconstitutionally burdens interstate com­
merce) ;  CTS Corp. v .  Dynamics Corp. of America, 48 1 U .S .  69 ( 1 987) (sustaining statute 
conditioning offeror's privilege to vote its shares on the approval of other shareholders) ; see 
Arthur R. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Stale Corporate Law, 4 1  U .  
MIAMI L .  REv. 4 73 ( 1 987 ) .  Here again, despite a l o t  of sound and fury, takeover activity does 
not seem to have been discouraged materially. 
236. For a recent manifestation of the new economic thinking, consider David Ruder, 
then the nominee for Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, telling Congress 
that the benefits to the shareholders of takeover premiums outweigh loss of employment and 
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ment in a respectable academic form specific to the context. The 
neoclassical variant, with its roots in classical economic theory, comes 
particularly well-made to support moneymaking by independent entre­
preneurs through bilateral contracting. 
Significantly, corporate legal doctrine performs a similar legitimiz­
ing role. The doctrine, despite its close association with managerialism 
throughout this century, has accommodated the resurgent capitalists 
without significant alteration. The received structure incorporates bi­
lateral contracting and aggregate interests. The doctrine made avail­
able all of the contractual devices employed in the restructuring 
market, and the long-standing conceptual association of management 
and the corporate entity did not prevent their use.237 Even as the re­
structuring takeover brought the continued validity of reams of 
managerialist literature into question, it left the doctrine nearly un­
touched.238 The historical doctrinal theory of the firm and its facilita­
tive and capacious qualities come to mind, providing the new economic 
theory with a "place" in the legitimization of the recent restructuring. 
C .  Comments 
The restructuring takeover does not return us to the world of Adam 
Smith. The number of managerial personnel may have declined; their 
identities may have changed; and conglomerate corporations may have 
become less bloated. But they still exist. Management retains a posi­
tion of "power by default." Its basic operational authority over re­
sources and people in the organization remains largely intact. 239 
Restructuring takeovers do not threaten the hierarchy; they only re­
place one set of managers with another. And aside from single rounds 
other disruptions of the local community. See Nathaniel Nash, A Hands-Off Takeover Stance. 
N.Y. Times , july 23 ,  1 987 ,  at D l ,  col. 3 .  
Congress only recently began seriously to consider additional procedural barriers to  
tender offers. See Proxmire t o  Offer Bill t o  Require Prenotification of Bidders · Purchases, BNA ' s CoRP. 
CouNs. WEEKLY, Apr. 1 5 , 1 987,  at I .  
237 .  One of the strongest examples of corporate law's continuing conceptual associa­
tion of management and the corporate entity is that management is permitted to engage in 
self-defense in the name of the entity .  See note 2 1 3  supra . That these defense tactics have had 
only limited success shows the constant power of contract .  
238.  Some of the  al terations protect management. See note 235 supra (discussing s ta te 
anti-takeover s ta tutes ) .  
Other developments result i n  intensified judicial scrutiny under the rubric o f  fiduciary 
duty. The old management expertise rationale carries less weight when the decisionmaking 
context is that of the sale of the entire company. In  these transactional contexts ,  courts feel 
more comfortable with close review for self-interested decisions. See, e.g. , Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings ,  Inc. ,  506 A.2d 1 73 (Del .  1 986) ; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858 (Del .  1 985 ) .  
239 .  Changes are beginning to appear here also, as management organization s tructures 
become looser and more flexible in emerging indus tries. See Michael J. Piore, Corporate Re­
form in American Manufacturing and the Challenge to Economic Theory (paper presented at 
the conference on Economics of Organization at the Yale School of Organization and Man­
agement, October 24-25, 1 986) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).  
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of cost cutting, no creative interplay between the restructuring takeover 
and the production operations of the firm has appeared. 
Assume that a chastened and more heavily monitored management 
emerges with its position otherwise left intact. It can, ironically, turn to 
contractualism to reconstruct a theory of the firm protective of its posi­
tion. Legal theory offers more than one model of contract. Theories 
more relational than that employed by the neoclassical new theorists 
offer values protective of individuals who invest their labor and ener­
gies in business enterprises, including firms. 240 
CoNCLUSION 
This article's historical perspectives do not deny the legitimacy of 
the new economic theory's approach to corporations. Nor do these 
perspectives deny that contract holds a constitutive place in firm life or 
that the new economic theory isolates significant aspects of corporate 
relationships. By contextualizing this theory of the firm discourse in 
time, however, these perspectives do facilitate a more accurate ap­
praisal of the new economic theory's contribution. The history 
prompts doubts as to the theorists' extreme essentialist claims: Their 
new corporate contract becomes hard to accept either as an evolution­
ary climax or as an objectively correct edifice standing outside of time. 
Instead, the theory appears as an edifice partly built on enduring ontol­
ogy, partly prompted by recent, perhaps transitory, trends in corporate 
practice, and partly shaped by the theorists' political dispositions. 
These historical perspectives, it should be noted, do not support 
discrimination among theories of the firm. They do not single out the 
new economic theory for critical questioning. Instead, they counsel wa­
riness of essentialist claims made for any academic theory of the firm. 
The history shows us that the pairs of opposing concepts that make up 
theories of the firm-entity and aggregate, contract and concession, 
public and private, discrete contract and relational contract-endure in 
opposition over time. Academic firm theories and corporate legal doc­
trine tend to handle these internal conflicts differently. Doctrinal firm 
theory lacks analytical integrity; the opposing concepts are synchro­
nized as decisionmakers make normative responses to unfolding events 
in business practice. If recognition of one of these contradictions re­
sults in analytical paralysis in a specific case, the doctrinalists deny the 
contradiction, mentioning one side only. Despite this lack of integrity, 
the doctrinal theory works well as it operates at close quarters with eco­
nomic practice. Rather than trying to privilege one or another contra­
dictory element, it builds the contradictions into a capacious structure 
240. See Bratton, supra note 1 7 , at . For an early example of contractual managerial-
ism, see Coffee's suggestion of sharingof takeover gains, or "premium sharing. " Coffee, 
supra note 2 1 6 ,  at 1 2 .  Coffee proposes a conception of corporate structure in which manage­
ment and shareholders share the position of residual risk bearer and res idual beneficiary. !d. 
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that loosely contains real-world producing organizations. This legal 
structure accommodates economic change easily. 
Practice also drives academic firm theory. But in an academic con­
text, a theory that follows the doctrine and merely synchronizes contra­
dictions in particular situations probably falls short of prevailing 
standards. Academics, free of the immediate problem of deciding 
cases, try to achieve analytical consistency; they attempt to transcend 
the contradictions. Academic theory of the firm, created in pursuit of 
this objective, has a more volatile, evolutionary pattern than does doc­
trinal theory. One tends to have to overstate things in order to achieve 
consistency and at the same time remain in touch with practice in a 
complex world. Wariness therefore is appropriate in considering new 
academic theories that purport to explain existing doctrine and at the 
same time satisfy academic standards. Such theories may have more 
reconstructive potential than their progenitors admit. 
The new economic theory falls into this historical pattern of aca­
demic/doctrinal interplay. Introduced in the law as a critical supple­
ment to managerialist theory, it succeeded because it recognized 
discrete contract as a constitutive part of firms. The recent appearance 
of discrete contract as an important corporate power tool made the the­
ory especially welcome: It brought academic theory closer both to 
business practice and to legal doctrine. But the theorists, driven by the 
academic need to universalize, outstripped this ontological base by 
privileging narrow notions of contract. 
Pressure builds up as the new theory's paradigm approaches he­
gemony in legal academic discussion. Some structure of thought will 
have to change. Two possible scenarios present themselves. Under 
one, the doctrine is reconstructed. The theory's influence causes the 
doctrine to be reformulated to eradicate strains that contradict the the­
ory. Under the other scenario, the theory adapts. The contract para­
digm expands to encompass the range of conflicting firm components. 
Given the history, the second scenario seems the more likely to occur. 
Doctrinal reconstruction tends to occur in response to practical, not 
theoretical, developments, legitimizing or inhibiting them as the case 
may be. Actors who create corporate law have shown little disposition 
to reconstitute it as a means to the end of recognition of the latest aca­
demic theory. 
